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## **Yugoslavia's Experience with the Non-Aligned Movement: Reconciling Formal Participation and Non-Bloc Policies**

Only a few years after the end of the Second World War socialist Yugoslavia started walking down the historical path that would lay the basic groundwork for its entire Cold War participation, putting the country right at the crossroads of not only European but also global politics. Within this new framework of intertwined internal and external policies, a new pattern gradually emerged for Yugoslavia to assume its specific place in the world, one that entailed both constructing a separate socio-economic system at home, clearly not resembling any rigid ideological models offered by both the East and the West, as well as pursuing an independent non-bloc policy abroad that implied principled worldwide cooperation between all relevant international factors, irrespective of their size and strength. Therefore, the socialist self-management system and the non-aligned foreign policy both became hallmarks of Yugoslavia's distinctive position within the bipolar international order after 1945, often serving as a role model for many developing countries outside Europe.<sup>1</sup>

This entire chapter, through its three major parts, will follow and analyze in broad strokes the origins, evolution and results of Yugoslavia's non-aligned/neutralist foreign policy primarily observed through the lens of Belgrade's specific role and concrete performance within the initially loosely based non-aligned group and then the fully-fledged Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a proper international organization. By mostly relying upon the relevant domestic and international literature and especially on newly declassified documents from the Yugoslav/Serbian and other international archives (Indian, Chinese, U.S., British, Soviet/Russian), this chapter will try to rediscover all significant moments that gradually led

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1 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju: od ideje do pokreta* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2019); Jovan Čavoški, "The Evolution of the NAM's Role in World Affairs during the Cold War Decades" in Duško Dimitrijević, Jovan Čavoški (eds.), *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement* (Belgrade: IIPE, 2021), 23-50.

the Yugoslav leadership to opt out from the policy of alliances with any of the two major Cold War blocs, choose the authentic path of non-alignment together with a number of leading non-bloc countries in Asia and Africa, while concurrently building up a joint and coordinated initiative of all these actors, ranging from major international strategic issues to developmental ones, that would all eventually find its strong embodiment in the global activism of NAM. Along that very path, Yugoslavia and its non-aligned allies would weather different periods of expansion and crisis, go through different ups and downs, carefully balancing between their well-established non-bloc credentials and corresponding necessities of practical politics, while simultaneously creating specific institutional mechanisms for the Third World or the Global South to assume its distinctive role in world affairs. In this respect, Yugoslavia's non-alignment stood at the very core of this crucial international history, very much determining country's destiny throughout the Cold War period and beyond.

### **Between Alignment and Non-Alignment: the Historical Origins and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Decisive Choice for a Non-Aligned Foreign Policy**

Yugoslavia's choice for non-alignment, or non-engagement as it was initially referred to in Belgrade, seeming to many as almost illogical from the standpoint of a divided Europe, was not something that was pre-ordained or even imminent when observed from a historical vantage point. On the other hand, "Yugoslavia had a formative influence on the character of non-alignment and played an influential role in its gradual institutionalization into the Non-Aligned Movement of states", therefore giving the country a much larger share in the steering of global currents than it was previously perceived.<sup>2</sup> Even though earlier Serbian/Yugoslav history occasionally offered lessons of statecraft that a less alliance-based foreign policy was a more adequate way of handling country's sensitive position in the geopolitics of Europe, thus seeking more liberty away from any great power arrangements, this was still not the easiest choice that any government, irrespective of its ideological leanings, would readily opt for. Nevertheless, during all these historical periods an independent stand while pursuing specific foreign policy objectives was an evident feature

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2 Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4.

that often served as an underlying factor of Yugoslavia's different external entanglements.<sup>3</sup>

In the past, different authors exclusively related the emergence of non-alignment to the successful completion of the anti-colonial struggle, since the majority of non-aligned countries came from the ranks of former colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, in Yugoslavia's case the choice for non-alignment was directly related to the negative inter-bloc dynamics that ultimately led to President Josip Broz Tito's decision to readily embrace his expulsion from the Soviet bloc, thus seeking new arrangements with other global actors primarily based on his country's independent interpretation of its national interest and the realistic and flexible approach to international relations in general.<sup>4</sup> In many ways, this kind of a comprehensive foreign policy strategy was not a mere reflection of Tito's overly ambitious stance and his unhidden desire to become a world statesman but, under concrete historical circumstances, more of a direct expression of his "pragmatism and his utterly realistic perception of political reality".<sup>5</sup>

In essence, Yugoslavia gradually started to identify its specific position with the general success of global non-alignment, thus trying to overcome its isolated position on the European continent through establishing a worldwide network, something like a safety net, of many different non-bloc actors. The main cause of such a new grouping in world politics was promotion of international stability, solidarity and cooperation between all members of the international community, while simultaneously seeking reduction of Cold War rivalries and broadening of the political basis of non-alignment, irrespective of racial, regional, national, cultural, historical, political, social, economic and other constraints.<sup>6</sup> For Tito, non-alignment rapidly transformed itself into a continuous struggle against the global status quo imposed by the blocs, one that often threatened Yugoslavia's existence, a stalemate that frequently hit hard against the very foundations of world peace and stability, while concurrently fomenting conditions that potentially bred the war that could have end-

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3 Dragan Bogetić, *Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost* (Beograd: ISI, 1990), 22-40.

4 Leo Mates, *Nesvrstanost: teorija i savremena praksa* (Beograd: IMPP, 1970), 224.

5 Dragan Bogetić, "Tito i nesvrstani: iskušenja na putu stvaranja asocijacije vanblokovskih država" in *Tito – viđenja i tumačenja* (Beograd: INIS, Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), 407.

6 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 281.

ed human civilization altogether.<sup>7</sup> As time passed, non-alignment transformed itself into a foreign policy imperative for Yugoslavia in its search of maintaining internal stability, acquiring guarantees of a more stable external surroundings, a respective tool for the promotion of its leading position among the nations of the world that refused to be considered as mere peons of great power politics.<sup>8</sup>

### From a revolutionary pariah to a pillar of non-alignment

Yugoslavia entered the Cold War world not as a mere exponent of bloc politics but as an authentic revolutionary power that, initially within the Soviet bloc, while standing on the very fault line of a newly emerging political division on the continent, had started charting its own sphere of influence, primarily in the Balkans, by often acting out as a communist maverick.<sup>9</sup> While being perceived as Stalin's most trusted allies, Tito and his comrades were convinced that their ambitious regional policies basically went along with Moscow's essential interests, which often was not the case, thus increasingly causing dissatisfaction with Belgrade's stance. In spite of occasional frictions, Yugoslavia's specific position within the socialist camp endowed it with a privileged standing that eventually resulted in choosing Belgrade as the seat of the newly-established Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), a body exclusively dedicated to strengthening the Soviet control over communist parties in Europe.<sup>10</sup>

While the coming conflict with Moscow was still brewing, Yugoslavia started casting its revolutionary gaze even beyond the European boundaries, thus discovering new worlds where the future non-aligned allies would be found. Its authentic revolutionary experience attracted distant communist parties' attention, predominantly the Asian ones, at the same time similarly engaged in waging revolutionary struggle. It also attracted interest from some non-communist ruling forces (Burma), with

7 Jovan Čavoški, "Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Nonaligned Movement 1961" in Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tine, Nada Boškovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014), 187-188.

8 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat: ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), 357-383.

9 Ibid., 114-116; Александар Живоћић, *Југославија, Албанија и велике силе 1945-1961* (Београд: Архипелаг, ИНИС, 2011), 277-293.

10 Robert Gellately, *Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 308-317.

many of them striving to emulate Yugoslavia's new political and economic system. Soon after the war, Belgrade became a place of pilgrimage for many of these political organizations. However, there was also a downside to this "revolutionary role model" phase that created controversies with the governments of these newly-liberated nations, with some Yugoslav visitors even trying to foment revolutionary upheavals in these societies.<sup>11</sup> In spite of the negative impact this brief historical episode produced, it eventually laid the groundwork for a future rapprochement with Asian countries that would ultimately serve as an opening for adopting a non-aligned foreign policy course in Yugoslavia.

When the Tito-Stalin split finally took place in mid-1948, it was indeed a groundbreaking moment that triggered the first serious rift in the international communist movement. This was an open conflict of two ruling communist parties, two socialist states, two charismatic leaders and two visions, one of them being bent on exercising total control over all ideological acolytes, and the other seeking a more independent and elevated position within the communist and international hierarchies.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, this watershed event also triggered an accelerated process of emancipation of Yugoslavia's communists who, although still not abandoning some of their old ideological bias and missionary zeal, initiated a sincere search for a separate road to socialism, one closely wedded to an independent non-bloc policy, a policy that firmly stood for the world that would not be under exclusive control of a handful of great powers.

The very first result of the ongoing conflict with Moscow was Yugoslavia's gradual political and economic rapprochement with the West, thus eventually bringing Belgrade to the very doorstep of potential NATO membership. This kind of booming relationship with the US and its allies seemed an attempt for substituting one alliance policy with another, thus only performing as a rationale for Yugoslavia's defection to the other bloc system.<sup>13</sup> However, this was basically not the case, irrespective of some painful compromises Belgrade was compelled to make in order to sur-

11 Jovan Čavoški, "Overstepping the Balkan Boundaries: The Lesser Known History of Yugoslavia's Early Relations with Asian Countries", *Cold War History*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2011), 559-568.

12 А.С. Аникеев, "Югославия в годы конфликта с СССР и странами народной демократии" in *Москва и Восточная Европа: советско-югославский конфликт и страны советского блока. 1948-1953 гг. Очерки истории* (Москва: Нестор-История, 2017), 15-51.

13 Lorejn Lis, *Održavanje Tita: Amerika, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat* (Beograd: BMG, 2003), 82-117, 143-149; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 124-127.

vive a total blockade from the East. In fact, very early on, in spite of certain reservations, rapprochement with newly-liberated Asian nations was sought as a political and economic leeway that would eventually diminish the effect of increasing isolation in Europe.<sup>14</sup> In a matter of months during 1948-49, Yugoslavia established diplomatic and economic relations with both India and Pakistan, while already sending out signals to other countries, like Burma or Ceylon (after 1972 Sri Lanka), expressing interest in expanding contacts with them too.<sup>15</sup>

As the Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia grew, especially after the eruption of the Korean War, with a potential armed invasion hovering over Tito's head, Yugoslavia decided to speed up its opening to the West so as to receive much needed aid to fend off any potential attack. Nevertheless, these moves also signaled that Tito was also actively exploring possibilities for launching a new foreign policy course, one far less ideological and more practical in its essence, increasingly a non-bloc one, primarily based on the tenacious defense of the basic principles of the UN Charter: independence, equality between states, sovereignty, peaceful cooperation, foreign non-interference, etc. Such a narrative perfectly fitted into the image that Belgrade aspired to project about the very nature of its conflict with Moscow as just being another blatant attempt of a great power unabashedly imposing its will on a small independent nation. Therefore, the UN would soon become the center stage where Yugoslavia would push its proactive struggle for winning the hearts and minds of world public opinion, especially among Asian and African nations, slowly mobilizing them behind Belgrade's concrete agenda, thus putting forward the same crucial issues plaguing their own uncertain existence after achieving decolonization.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, during these years the UN also served as a key arena where the prestige of non-bloc actors as potential independent conflict mediators was further boosted, while simultaneously performing its role as an extended platform for promoting further rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the post-colonial world. During 1950-51, Yugo-

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14 Diplomatic archives of the Serbian Foreign Ministry (DAMSPS), Political Archives (PA), year 1948, folder (f) 90, document 41410, Bebler's letter to the embassy in Britain, January 22 1949.

15 National Archives of India (NAI), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 36-R&I/48, Telegram from the High Commission in Britain, April 2 1949.

16 Jadranka Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Ujedinjenim Nacijama 1945-1953* (Beograd: ISI, 1985), 42-44; Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), CC LCY, 507/III, 54, Kardelj's report from the 5<sup>th</sup> UNGA session, October 1950.

slavia, India and Egypt were elected as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, thus closely coordinating their diplomatic efforts at mediating this conflict or at least thwarting its further escalation. This close cooperation eventually resulted in Yugoslavia's almost adjunct status to the Afro-Asian group in the UN, with both sides discovering an almost identical character of their basic views and aspirations, thus opening new possibilities for the two sides to use more opportunities to align their individual efforts in pursuing joint goals and resisting similar dangers.<sup>17</sup> However, Yugoslavia's proximity to the West at that time sometimes raised eyebrows in both India and Burma about Belgrade's true foreign policy orientation.<sup>18</sup>

At that time the biggest obstacle to fully launching Yugoslavia's bid for non-alignment did not come from outside sources but from inside the regime, from some top-level officials who still harbored old ideological bias about the "true" nature of new governments emerging in Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, diplomats on the ground, like Josip Đerđa and others, better understood the enormous potential that closer cooperation with these nations would yield to Yugoslavia, not only politically but economically too, thus providing Belgrade with a major leverage for gradually realigning its entire foreign policy posture.<sup>19</sup> In spite of some Indian dragging of the feet, Đerđa did manage to put Yugoslavia firmly on New Delhi's mental map as one of its closest collaborators in Europe; while in the case of Burma, soon to become Belgrade's most intimate ally in Asia, it was Đerđa who would become the person who broke ground and initiated rapid diplomatic recognition with that nation as well.<sup>20</sup> In many ways, Đerđa's reports and what he conveyed to Tito and others after returning home in late 1951 eventually served as a turning point for actively pushing Yugoslavia's foreign policy in the direction of avoiding any bloc association, while seeking key partners in the regions outside Europe.<sup>21</sup>

17 Dragan Bogetić, *Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost*, 217-218; Jadranka Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Ujedinjenim nacijama*, 89-93.

18 *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Second Series)* (SWJN), Vol. 18 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1996), 541; NAI, MEA, 91-R&I/51, Special Report on Yugoslavia, February 16 1951.

19 Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949-1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 194-195; Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959-1962* (Beograd: INIS, 2009), 42-44.

20 DAMSPS, PA, 1951, f-33, 42331, Telegram from the Embassy in India, January 28 1951; 1951, f-68, 42987, Telegram from the Embassy in India, March 7 1951.

21 AJ, 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR), I-5-b, India, Kardelj's instruction to Vilfan, 1952.



From then on, pursuing cooperation with Afro-Asian nations would become one of the central goals of Yugoslavia's external performance for decades to come.

While relations with India evolved at a much slower pace, despite exchanges of some high-level visits in 1953, it was nevertheless Burma that became the real testing ground for Yugoslavia's global ideological, political, economic and military influence.<sup>22</sup> Already in 1951-52, the first major Burmese civilian-military delegations came to Yugoslavia to study its state-building efforts. Soon enough, taking into account Burma's ongoing civil war and foreign aggression from Chinese Nationalist troops, Yugoslavia initiated major arms shipments to that country which would fundamentally alter the security situation on the ground by 1955.<sup>23</sup> Besides, Yugoslavia's internal search for its own socialist model perfectly fitted into the concurrent search initiated by different socialist, but non-communist political forces in Asia, seeking to set up an ideological and non-bloc alternative to both sides of the Cold War division through the establishment of the Asian Socialist Conference in January 1953. In this respect, Yugoslavia's recent historical experiences proved to be quite edifying, with Belgrade becoming the organization's only non-Asian member, thus also serving as another stepping stone towards new non-aligned activities of the future.<sup>24</sup>

With Stalin's death in March 1953 and the subsequent end of the Korean War, international politics entered into a period of rapid relaxation of tensions, with a policy of negotiations and non-confrontation, gradually gaining the upper hand. While the two blocs were engaged in intensive exchanges to resolve disputes in Europe and Asia during 1953-55, ideas about post-colonial nations in Afro-Asia launching a collective and coordinated response to the great power politics outside the UN fora were also gaining ground, with newly-liberated Asian nations spearheading this effort to set up a summit model where they could freely express their views and offer corresponding solutions to any major world issues.<sup>25</sup> This kind

22 DAMSPS, PA, 1953, f-37, 410445, Visit of the Indian Vice-President Radhakrishnan, July 22-26 1953.

23 AJ, CC LCY, 507/IX, 17/VI-3, Note on the visit of the Burmese delegation, July 26 1952; Jovan Čavoški, "Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia's Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia, 1950-1955", *CWIHP Working Paper No. 61* (2010), 23-50.

24 Jovan Čavoški, "Ideološki prijatelj iz daleka: Jugoslavija i Azijska socijalistička konferencija", *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (2019), 139-160.

25 NAI, MEA, 1871(24)-AWT/53, Arab-Asian unity, July 17 1953; Cindy Ewing, "The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia at



of initiative would soon evolve into the first Asian-African Conference held in the Indonesian town of Bandung in April 1955, one of NAM's predecessors but not a direct precursor to it.

Under such altered conditions, Yugoslavia was also undergoing fundamental changes that would eventually influence its ultimate decision to overtly embrace non-alignment. Not only had Tito soon discovered limits to his engagement with the West, which in time started to endanger his own grip on power, but the decreasing pressure from Moscow also opened up possibilities for reconciliation between the two sides, primarily on Yugoslavia's terms. While tentatively exploring Soviet intentions, Tito also hedged his bets by forging closer military ties with two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, but without ever succumbing to the temptation of joining the Western bloc.<sup>26</sup> That was the maximum he sought in his dealings with both blocs, thus getting additional security guarantees for Yugoslavia's independence, while concurrently widening his horizons towards the new frontiers of world politics, places where Yugoslavia's independent position and advice would be well sought after.

Tito's visit to India and Burma, which took place in December 1954 – January 1955, initiated on Burma's invitation but soon also extended to India, truly represented a revolutionary moment for Yugoslavia, one primarily marked by a radical crossing into a totally new sphere of foreign interactions where non-alignment would become the fulcrum of Belgrade's presence on the world stage. Through his close interactions with the leaders of India, Burma and, on his way back, Egypt, Tito had both intellectually and practically evolved into a familiar image of a globe-trotting statesman poised at overcoming any constraints of European politics, while simultaneously assuming the role of spokesperson of that part of the world which proclaimed its non-bloc character as the paramount one. He was, in fact, the very first European leader paying visits to these countries after they had gained independence, seeing in them a potent hidden force, both material and demographic, that could have eventually changed the very fabric of the international order. Furthermore, this journey had also stirred serious discontent in both blocs, with many in the West falsely considering that Tito, together with his Indian and Bur-

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Bandung", *Cold War History* 19.1 (2019), 1-19.

26 Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955: jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u* (Beograd: Službeni list, 2000), 141-154; А.Б. Едемский, *От конфликта к нормализации: советско-югославские отношения в 1953-1956 годах* (Москва: Наука, 2008), 243-272.

mese counterparts Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu, was trying to set up something resembling a non-aligned “third bloc” that would be fully dedicated to breaking up the superpower monopoly in world politics. Nevertheless, this encounter between the European and Asian wings of non-alignment was, indeed, marked by an evident desire expressed by all parties not to accept the dictate of great powers any more, especially by strongly emphasizing the principles of equality, security, peaceful co-existence and unhindered cooperation as the fundamental rights of all nations.<sup>27</sup>

Soon after, during 1955-56, Yugoslavia was increasingly becoming the place where diverse streaks of non-alignment dispersed over three different continents clearly intersected, with a number of prominent non-aligned leaders (India, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia) arriving in Belgrade or Tito undertaking visits to new regions, like Africa (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia). In both these cases, all these leaders were intensively exchanging views, discussing pressing world issues, and also forging a more unified position, as well as profoundly debating the launching of a better coordinated international action both inside and outside the UN.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the Bandung Conference was clearly marked by a restrictive regionalist framework, with an only abstract perception of shared colonial sufferings as a mutual bond, thus totally neglecting the fact that at such a gathering both aligned and non-aligned nations of Afro-Asia were sitting together, even though their fundamental interests and aspirations in a bloc-divided world could not have been the same. Essentially, as perceived by Yugoslavia, non-alignment went well beyond these two continents and its non-bloc essence was the principal criterion for participation in any future undertakings.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, summitry became an important lesson that Bandung had to offer to the non-aligned in the future, primarily as a means of presenting their collective views to the world. However, according to the Yugoslav officials, any such endeavor needed to be thoroughly prepared in advance, while every action had to have its leaders, largely acting as pillars of non-alignment, who should not come from just one region and

27 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 136-187.

28 AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/15-5, Tito-U Nu talks, June 10-12 1955; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), Subimal Dutt Collection, Subject File (SF) 82, Tito-Nehru talks, July 1-2 1955; AJ, 837, KPR, I-2-5, Tito-Nasser talks, December 29 1955 – January 5 1956.

29 Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt*, 79-80.

they should be authentically non-bloc in their orientation.<sup>30</sup> In the words of one author, “more than any other country, Yugoslavia helped to make of Bandung a prologue to political action rather than a footnote to futility”.<sup>31</sup> This was more than evident when Tito decided to invite Nehru and the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to visit Yugoslavia in July 1956, thus organizing the first tripartite meeting at the Brioni islands where European, Asian and African/Middle Eastern wings of non-alignment would come together and see, as an informal steering committee, what the next steps should be in building up the non-aligned initiative by applying the vestiges of peaceful co-existence and collective security in an increasingly restive world. Even though this meeting faced many limitations, enjoying mostly a mythical character in the historiography as “Third World’s Yalta”, it did set up a multilateral mechanism of coordination and exchanges that put these three leaders at the very core of a more closely knitted global non-alignment than it was ever before the case.<sup>32</sup>

### Global non-alignment comes to Belgrade

Even though the Brioni meeting acted as a harbinger of future winds, nevertheless, this was still a singular event without any official follow-up, very similar to what had already been occurring with its competitive Bandung model.<sup>33</sup> Tito was well aware that any future non-aligned initiatives needed a strong push on his behalf, since young Nasser still did not wield that much global influence, while Nehru, a globally revered statesman, nonetheless, still held onto his old beliefs that put him firmly against launching any world-wide collective diplomatic actions of non-bloc nations. This was quite evident when Nehru refused to back up Tito’s late 1957 initiative to hold a non-aligned summit on the issue of nuclear disarmament, also discarding any thoughts of convening another tripartite meeting, as well as rejecting the call made by Yugoslavia, Egypt (at that time the United Arab Republic - UAR), and Indonesia for organiz-

30 DAMSPS, PA, 1955, f-54, 44673, Telegram to the Embassy in India, April 9 1955; AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-e, Assessment of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, April 1955.

31 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 64.

32 SWJN, Vol. 34 (2005), 297-304; Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York-London: The New Press, 2007), 95-96.

33 Russian State Archive for Contemporary History (RGANI), fond (f) 5, opis’ (op) 30, document (d) 306, listy (l) 224-226, Proposal for convening the Afro-Asian economic conference, February 21 1959.

ing a non-bloc gathering coinciding with the failed East-West summit in Paris in May 1960.<sup>34</sup>

In spite of Indian reluctance to back Tito's bid, the Yugoslav president decided to use an opportune moment, one when he was compelled to enter into a new ideological conflict with Moscow and Beijing in 1958, to set off on a two months journey to a number of Asian and African nations in late 1958 – early 1959. While simultaneously opening possibilities for a more intensive bilateral political and economic rapprochement between Yugoslavia and these countries, Tito was also feeling the political pulse of the non-aligned world, as well as exploring the tentative potential a joint action could produce at the time when the superpower relationship was again on a downhill slope.<sup>35</sup> What this journey did, in fact, discover for Tito was that it was only he and Nasser, and up to a point Indonesian leader Ahmed Sukarno, that had both the authority and relative international weight to bring all other non-aligned leaders together, since Nehru could not be counted on for the time being.

With the onset of the early 1960s, the East-West conflict was continuously escalating both in Europe and around the Third World, threatening to turn into an open clash between the blocs. Concurrently, an increasing number of countries, especially in Africa, were completing their decolonization and joining the UN as still uncommitted members.<sup>36</sup> To the officials in Belgrade, it was the UN that seemed like a suitable place to start with any new non-aligned initiatives. Not only were the two blocs then wrestling for the control over the international organization, and that made them vulnerable to any moves that could tip the balance in New York, but this was also the only major arena where small nations could, without any hindrance, express their views, discuss any issues on an equal footing with the great powers, as well as try to push through, by using their rising numbers, any key issues pertinent to their agenda.<sup>37</sup> While Moscow was trying to use India and the UAR to promote its goals at the forthcoming 15<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 1960,

34 AJ, 837, KPR, I-1/366, Tito's letter to Nehru, December 16 1957; NMML, Subimal Dutt Collection, SF 39, S.Dutt instruction, December 14 1959.

35 Jovan Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt*, 115-156; Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956-1961* (Beograd: ISI, 2006), 314-342.

36 Aleksandr Fursenko, Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: the Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 185-213, 263-291, 295-306, 323-337, 342-366.

37 DAMSPS, PA, 1960, f-140, 424227, Telegram from the Embassy in India, September 15 1960.

though largely unsuccessfully, Tito was still observed by the Soviets as someone who could still not be trusted and whose activities went against their goals in the UN.<sup>38</sup>

Tito understood well that the destiny of the world peace was too precious to be left in the hands of the two superpowers. As the precarious global balance of power clearly demonstrated, small nations also had their fair share of responsibility to be stated and accordingly implemented, primarily by using superpower sensitivities with respect to their own position, image and influence, all in order for the world to avoid any further deterioration of an already utterly tense situation. This UNGA session presented itself as the right moment to launch the so-called “initiative of the five”, a coordinated attempt put in motion by Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, Nehru, and the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah to reveal to the wider world the level of danger it was then facing, and offer corresponding solutions to the pressing international issues.<sup>39</sup> Critical world public opinion was the primary bet of the non-aligned leaders and they did everything possible to substantially raise the general consciousness about the dramatic times they were all living in.

Tito and Nasser were obviously leading the way in this bid, closely backed by Sukarno and Nkrumah, while Nehru remained skeptical about the meaningfulness of any collective actions, primarily counting on India's size and wider importance as having much more weight with the superpowers than other non-aligned countries ever could. However, soon enough he was also compelled to stand in line.<sup>40</sup> This collective action was a true surprise for both blocs, since for the first time overall numbers in the UN did not stand in their favor, therefore they did everything to use procedural matters so as to water down non-aligned demands and eventually subvert them altogether.<sup>41</sup> In spite of somber mood due to this diplomatic failure, in Tito's opinion, the non-aligned, in general, could still be very satisfied with the outcome. Firstly, they truly made the blocs worry about their demands, thus significantly raising their value in world affairs, while, secondly, the amount of diplomatic pressure they could wield on

38 Ilya Gaiduk, “New York, 1960: Die Sowjetunion und die dekolonialisierte Welt auf der Funfzehnten Sitzung der UN-Vollversammlung” in Andreas Hilger (ed.), *Die Sowjetunion und die Dritte Welt: UdSSR, Staatssozialismus und Antikolonialismus im Kalten Krieg* (München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2009), 107-115.

39 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/12, Tito's report on the UN trip, October 13 1960.

40 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/12, Tito-Nasser talks, September 25 1960; Tito-Nehru talks, September 8 1960.

41 DAMSPS, PA, 1960, f-140, 426134, Telegram from the UN mission, October 6 1960.

the superpowers would only increase in time, especially as the bloc conflict further escalated. Therefore, he openly stated in New York that “at this General Assembly non-aligned forces are becoming more numerous, unified, and aware of the dangers threatening mankind...They have become a factor great powers must take into account”.<sup>42</sup>

While other non-aligned leaders took a step back after New York, Tito, still perceiving the non-aligned world as having real potential to ultimately restructure international politics, decided to set off on another long journey to countries of West and North Africa in early 1961. The main goal of this trip was to forge an extensive front with some new allies, as well as with old ones too, while also exploring possibilities for convening the first non-aligned summit in the autumn, one where one third of humanity, not just five countries as before, would strongly raise its collective voice against aggressive superpower policies and present its vociferous demands in the fields of security, cooperation and development as its truly unified position.<sup>43</sup> These overarching goals of Tito’s journey sounded the alarm in Washington, Moscow and Beijing, with each of these three capitals giving way to their worries about the nature and scope of Yugoslavia’s activities in Africa and how they fitted into Tito’s general ambition of becoming the central leader of the non-aligned world.<sup>44</sup> However, the Yugoslav president understood well that his outstanding position among his peers depended on his willingness to readily share these leadership credentials. Therefore, he undertook these long journeys and set up private meetings so as to establish close personal relations with all these leaders, giving them their rightful due in this joint endeavor, a treatment they were not receiving from any of the great powers.

Before long, and using his personal charm and political skills, Tito was able to get the most of the leaders he had met while visiting Africa on board. Thus, Tito and Nasser were finally able to formulate the general proposal for the future summit that also won Sukarno’s favors.<sup>45</sup> As it was expected, Nehru still held onto his reservations, considering such an idea

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42 Josip Broz Tito, *Govori i članci*, Vol. 16 (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1962), 70.

43 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/13, Tito’s report on his visit to West and North African countries, April 29 1961.

44 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG 59), Central Decimal Files (CDF), 1960-63, box 1375, 668.00/4-2661, Yugoslav policy in the underdeveloped countries, April 26 1961; DAMSPS, PA, 1961, f-56, 410448, Telegram from the Embassy in the USSR, April 3 1960; Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (CFMA), 108-00771-02, Tito’s trip to West and North Africa, April 22 1961.

45 Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije*, 349-362.



as both premature and not well formulated. However, when pressed with growing numbers of potential participants, he was well aware that India, due to its prestige, could not stay out of this event. The only thing New Delhi could do was use its massive influence as the cradle of non-alignment to push through some of its own ideas.<sup>46</sup> Even though some of India's attempts faced stiff opposition during the preparatory meeting in Cairo in June, thus demonstrating clear boundaries of India's influence among the non-aligned, Tito was well aware that without Nehru, guarding his back with his moderating influence, more radical forces in the Third World could have prevailed.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, winning over India became an obvious priority on the Yugoslav agenda.

When Belgrade was selected as the host of the future summit, this proved to be a stellar moment for both Tito and Yugoslavia, thus putting Belgrade right at the helm of the non-aligned world, while also attracting considerable interest from all relevant international factors. Since this was the moment when the Berlin Crisis was escalating with the erection of the Wall in mid-August, both superpowers increasingly directed attention to Yugoslavia, trying to influence the future conference agenda and its outcome so as to secure the most favorable outcome for their side.<sup>48</sup> This put Tito in an awkward position where he was facing both the rising US pressure not to allow for the forthcoming event to toe the Soviet line, as well as overt Soviet attempts to produce quite the opposite effect, hoping that the leftist leaning of non-aligned leaders would eventually prevail and back Moscow's stand.<sup>49</sup> In a way to bully Tito into submission, while overshadowing his grand historical debut, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to restart nuclear tests on the eve of the Belgrade Conference, a move which essentially did not surprise the Yugoslav leadership.<sup>50</sup> This kind of tense international atmosphere was one of the reasons why Tito had previously admonished Sukarno that the forthcoming conference should not be calibrated as the "frontal assault against the blocs" but it should pursue a principled middle-of-the-road line where the con-

46 DAMSPS, PA, f-116, 416838, Telegram from the Embassy in India, April 28 1961.

47 NAI, MEA, CON/27/61-AFR I, Some aspects of the preparatory meeting, June 1961; DAMSPS, PA, f-117, 422060, Telegram from the Foreign Secretariat, July 17 1961.

48 Robert B. Rakove, "Two Roads to Belgrade: the United States, Great Britain, and the First Nonaligned Conference", *Cold War History* 14.3 (2014), 346-348.

49 NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1960-63, box 732, 396.1-BE/8-361, Memorandum for the President: Belgrade Conference, August 3 1961; DAMSPS, PA, 1961, f-118, 426269, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, August 28 1961.

50 AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a, USSR, Tito-Yepishev talks, August 30 1961.



ference agenda and its results should be put together based solely on the interests of non-aligned countries and no one else.<sup>51</sup>

The Belgrade Conference, an ad hoc gathering without any planned aftermath, held on September 1-6 1961, was indeed a watershed moment in the history of global non-alignment, a major stepping stone towards the eventual establishment of NAM.<sup>52</sup> For the very first time, 25 non-aligned countries (and three observers), brought together only by their non-bloc credentials, in spite of all other inherent differences, nonetheless, stood shoulder-to-shoulder at this specific moment in time, demonstrating to the world at large that there was yet another option in international politics beyond just the two blocs, it also had its own opinion and aspirations, strength in numbers, and a significant strategic potential to disturb the barely tenable balance of power between Washington and Moscow. In Tito's words, this was the "consciousness of mankind", primarily referring to those nations that put general interests of peace, stability, equality and cooperation above everything else, since without these fundamental necessities these small countries would be the first ones to be at the receiving end of a wider superpower conflict. This did not mean these countries did not possess individual interests but their sustainability clearly depended on the general stability they all argued for.<sup>53</sup>

The proceedings were marked by a very heated debate encompassing diverse issues like anti-colonialism, bloc conflict, disarmament, UN role, economic development, crisis hotspots, cooperation between non-aligned countries etc., with certain disagreements occasionally also coming to the surface. In fact, Tito was continuously insisting that a unanimous stand on all major issues had to be reached by all means, leaving only minor ones to bilateral consideration.<sup>54</sup> Essentially, Tito's idea was to use this event to set off a mechanism for a permanent collective action of all non-aligned factors in the future, although still without setting up any permanent organizations, but with an eye on formulating a coherent long-term global strategy for the non-aligned within the existing world order by giving equal prominence to both security and economic issues.<sup>55</sup>

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51 AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a, Indonesia, Tito-Sukarno talks, June 16 1961.

52 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 77-87.

53 *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September, 1-6, 1961* (Belgrade: Yugoslavia, 1961), 17-22.

54 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a, Survey of speeches of heads of delegations on the first, second, third day of the conference.

55 Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije*, 372-373; AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a, Tito's speech during the general debate, September 3 1961.

It was these specific security and economic proposals formulated by him that produced the biggest impact on the subsequent events, thus presenting a lasting legacy of the Belgrade Conference. This was particularly related to the formation of the UN 18 Nations Disarmament Committee, where non-aligned representatives also took active part, as well as to the convening of the Economic Conference of Developing Countries in Cairo in July 1962, where the groundwork was laid for organizing the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) two years later.<sup>56</sup>

In spite of Tito's "infamous" speech on September 3 that drew a lot of ire from the US for its pro-Soviet leanings and, not surprisingly, positive reactions from the Soviets<sup>57</sup>, the Belgrade Conference successfully concluded its work by adopting two key documents – the "Declaration" and the "Appeal for Peace" which both largely reflected Yugoslavia's position on the issues of peace, security, peaceful co-existence, eradication of colonialism, economic development, introduction of necessary changes in the UN system, etc. These were all integral parts of the future struggle for establishing a more just and equitable world order in line with the basic needs of the non-aligned.<sup>58</sup> In many ways, Yugoslavia's efforts set off a comprehensive process that would introduce substantial changes into the non-aligned world in the following decade, thus creating an evident alternative to the dominant bloc politics, even at first a less organized one, but still with sharpened instincts for comprehending the nature and course of major global tendencies.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, this seminal event also demonstrated to all attendees that Yugoslavia was also more than capable of organizing such a complex international event in a manner similar to the great powers, and also demonstrating achievements of its system that drew praise from many participants.<sup>60</sup>

56 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 296-297; Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 110-111.

57 NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1960-63, box 733, 396.1-BE/9-2161, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, September 21 1961; RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 370, l. 71-72, Letter from the CC CPSU member Gafurov.

58 Leo Mates, *Počelo je u Beogradu: 20 godina nesvrstanosti* (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), 47-52.

59 DAMSPS, PA, 1961, f-118, 427253, Preliminary evaluation of the conference, September 11 1961.

60 NARA, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Box 2, 396.1/11-1461, The Belgrade Conference in Retrospect, November 14 1961.

## Yugoslavia against the regionalist onslaught

when the superpower conflict was winding down after the potentially disastrous Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, with both blocs soon finding new ways of promoting mutual accommodation and compromises, the non-aligned group, rapidly losing some of its previous unity and dynamics, faced a serious identity crisis that would demonstrate to other relevant world actors that the potential for a South-South conflict was sometimes equally dangerous for the Third World as was the East-West one. This worrisome trend was even more surprising since in the aftermath of the Belgrade Conference general prospects seemed very bright for the non-aligned, however, the lessening of tensions between the superpowers opened up opportunities for both the US and the USSR to more aggressively interfere in Third World affairs without endangering the overall strategic stability between the two sides of the Cold War. This new round of escalating foreign meddling would drive many non-aligned countries into the arms of the local radicals.<sup>61</sup>

In fact, this crisis would soon transform itself into an almost unbridgeable chasm between the “moderate” and “radical” members of the non-aligned group, on the one hand, Yugoslavia, India, UAR and others, advocating universalist principles of restraint, pragmatism, flexibility, security, development and wider cooperation, and on the other, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea and others, arguing for a more militant course of an unceasing struggle against imperialism, colonialism and exploitation represented primarily by the Western Bloc. This would not just be a conceptual conflict between the two Third World camps but also a geographic one, where one side stood for more profound ideas that went across countries, regions and continents, while the other one became bogged down in the regional notion of Afro-Asia as both the first and last line of defense for the entire post-colonial world. Soon enough, this confrontation would evolve into a diplomatic showdown between the two conference models, the non-aligned one and the Afro-Asian one, where Yugoslavia and Indonesia, backed by China, were respectively leading these conflicting efforts.<sup>62</sup>

Ever since 1955, organizing a follow-up to Bandung was one of Sukarno’s overarching goals, regardless of the fact that a conference of such

61 Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 182-233; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 298-299.

62 Јован Чавошки, “Други Београд или други Бандунг? Југославија и борба за превласт унутар Трећег света (1962-1965)”, *Токови историје* 2 (2021), 87-117.

a type would narrow down any non-bloc initiatives to just two continents, thus effectively excluding Europe and Latin America from that format, with many bloc nations also attending this event.<sup>63</sup> This idea was, therefore, out of the question for Yugoslavia, since Belgrade's European and non-aligned credentials would not allow it to participate. While Tito was still pursuing his idea of holding the first non-aligned conference during 1961, Sukarno was in parallel actively exploring possibilities for holding a new Afro-Asian conference in the near future, one which, in his mind, stood taller to what his Yugoslav counterpart was advocating.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, eagerness demonstrated by other key non-aligned countries to organize the Belgrade Conference, and the lack of interest for taking part in any regionalist gatherings all forced Sukarno's hand to temporarily put his plans on hold. However, while in the Yugoslav capital, he would play again the old card of stirring up the inevitable conflict between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world, an approach that caused misunderstandings with both Nehru and Tito but won him real favors in Beijing.<sup>65</sup>

While the Belgrade Conference was, indeed, a historical moment where Yugoslavia finally proved its leadership credentials, thus largely setting the pace of any future actions, for Sukarno that was an event where his role as the original leader of the non-aligned was clearly overshadowed by Tito's astute performance.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, in Indonesian projections, the Afro-Asian format proved to be the one where Tito would be totally excluded, while Nehru, with the help of China, would be effectively sidelined in Asia, thus leaving Sukarno in charge of the one third of humanity, with other leaders, like Nasser, being eventually forced to stand in line without enjoying Yugoslav and Indian strong backing any more.<sup>67</sup> Naturally, this would not be the case, in spite of India's defeat in the border war with China in October-November 1962. Even though New Delhi's non-aligned orientation came under serious pressure from both superpowers during that conflict, with Yugoslavia and the UAR playing a be-

63 CFMA, 204-01469-02, Mao-Sukarno talks, June 13 1961.

64 CFMA, 105-01044-01, Indonesia plans convening second Afro-Asian conference, May 11 1961.

65 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 331-334, 340-342; CFMA, 105-01043-02, Indonesian performance at the non-aligned conference, September 13 1961.

66 AJ, 837, KPR I-5-b/40-4, Talks between ambassador Pavlič and ambassador Tamsil, November 25 1962.

67 DAMSPS, PA, 1962, f-105, 429379, Activities concerning the second AA conference, September 11 1962.

hind-the-scenes role that eventually enabled India's preservation of its original course, these crisis events only further strengthened bonds between the three nations, contrary to Indonesia's expectations.<sup>68</sup>

This new race between the two conference models, as well as the global promotion of true non-alignment, both became a pressing matter for Tito, since under any other scenario Yugoslavia would be effectively expelled from the Third World by other more potent regional actors, thus being constrained to European politics where the two blocs evidently dominated the landscape.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, Tito understood well the overall complexity and interdependent character of the world he lived in, a world which was gradually evolving into a less bipolar one, where emerging splits inside the blocs and among Third World countries were opening up new possibilities for rearranging the entire world order along the lines where all major issues would be treated as equally relevant for all parties, while certain moral and legal obligations would be endorsed by all actors as both the general framework and the direct means for resolving any outstanding issues.<sup>70</sup>

It was quite important for Yugoslavia that global non-alignment followed a constructive line of negotiations with both blocs, thus avoiding coming into direct conflict with any of them, as it was often argued by both Indonesia and China. Tito was well aware that nothing would be given for free to the non-aligned, therefore, fierce diplomatic struggle for emancipation and recognition was inevitable, but what also needed to be avoided was a showdown with the militarily and economically more powerful part of the world that would turn non-alignment's future into an uncertain one. In fact, it would be Tito's platform presented at the 18<sup>th</sup> UNGA session, one which treated issues of fighting colonialism and racism, disarmament and economic development that would eventually become a rallying point for the non-aligned group in an even-handed manner, since that was the agenda the majority could easily stand behind, irrespective of their individual differences.<sup>71</sup> As a means to outmaneuver

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68 Jovan Čavoški, "Saving Non-Alignment: Diplomatic Efforts of Major Non-Aligned Countries and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict" in Lorenz Lüthi, Amit Das Gupta (eds.), *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2017), 160-178.

69 NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), 1964-66, box 1830, POL 8, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, February 14 1964.

70 Josip Broz Tito, *Govori i članci*, Vol. 18 (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1966), 426-437.

71 DAMSPS, PA, 1963, f-111, 438824, Telegram from the Embassy in India, December 1 1963.

other contenders, the Indonesians, therefore, decided to start promoting the Afro-Asian conference as a prelude to the non-aligned one, directing its course to resolving bilateral conflicts, while the Belgrade-type gathering would only tackle major international issues, thus blunting the edge of Yugoslavia's diplomatic offensive.<sup>72</sup> In time, Jakarta would start portraying the non-aligned conference as a botched last-stand attempt made by Yugoslavia and India to preserve whatever remained of their fledgling influence in the Third World.<sup>73</sup>

While the Chinese, Indonesian and Yugoslav top-level delegations were crisscrossing Asia and Africa, actively trying to solicit support for the earliest possible convening of one or the other conference, eventually it was the non-aligned preparatory meeting in Colombo that took place first in March 1964. For this event, the "moderate" group drew up a conference agenda that treated both groups' crucial issues equally, thus rendering the necessity of holding another Afro-Asian meeting redundant. It was then decided that the next non-aligned summit would be held in Cairo in October. This caused fury in both Beijing and Jakarta, particularly against Yugoslavia, triggering a more vibrant diplomatic activity on their behalf.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, it was eventually decided to hold the Afro-Asian conference the following year, with most non-aligned nations now focusing their attention on Cairo. This led to Sukarno being frustrated at the fact that his brainchild was left almost powerless, with an equally undermined anti-imperialist agenda.<sup>75</sup>

In fact, Yugoslavia decided to use the forthcoming conference to actively promote opposition to all forms of subjugation, foreign meddling and inequalities, being it neo-colonialism, armed interventionism or underdevelopment, primarily insisting on forging stronger political and economic bonds between the non-aligned countries themselves, a firm basis for a better organized collective action in the future.<sup>76</sup> In this respect, Belgrade would soon become a rallying point for many non-aligned leaders

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72 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1964-66, box 1830, POL 8, Conflicting proposals for non-aligned and Afro-Asian conferences, January 9 1964.

73 DAMSPS, PA, 1964, f-173, 41510, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, January 15 1964.

74 NAI, MEA, 118(78)/WII/64, Report on the Colombo preparatory meeting, March 1964; CFMA, 109-02792-03, Conspiracy of the Tito Clique to organize the second non-aligned conference, April 2 1964.

75 DAMSPS, PA, 1964, f-175, 428819, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia, July 7 1964.

76 DAMSPS, PA, 1964, f-175, 435888, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, September 13 1964.

and other top officials on their way to Cairo, thus trying to set up a more closely knitted group of “moderates”, one that would do everything possible to balance the ominous activism of the “radicals” at the forthcoming summit.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, since Nehru suddenly passed away in May, Sukarno felt emboldened by his expectations that most of the Asian non-aligned would not be able to effectively oppose his stance in Cairo, so he was seriously preparing for a diplomatic showdown with Tito.<sup>78</sup>

The Cairo Conference, held on October 5-10 1964, with 47 non-aligned countries attending it (and 10 observers)<sup>79</sup>, was immediately branded by a conceptual conflict between Tito and Sukarno, one where the Yugoslav president perceived the lessening of international tensions and the growing importance of peaceful co-existence as a positive signal for the non-aligned to reinvent their global role under these new conditions and prepare thoroughly for future negotiations with the great powers about the very nature of the world order. On the other hand, the Indonesian president considered peaceful co-existence as just another guarantee of the existing status quo, a rotten compromise between the superpowers made at the expense of small nations in order to facilitate external meddling in their affairs. Furthermore, he also presented non-alignment as an already obsolete notion, a past phase in the just struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Accepting some of Sukarno’s arguments about the unfair policies of both blocs, Tito stressed that a call for radical solutions would prove to be nothing more than the shortest path to a disaster that could only wipe out the entire non-aligned world, thus essentially supplanting bloc confrontation with the racial and class one.<sup>80</sup> In a private discussion with Sukarno, Tito pointed out that struggle against neo-colonialism was a multifaceted endeavor where all available tools should be utilized, while this kind of struggle should never be confronted with the struggle for peace, since these were two complementary undertakings.<sup>81</sup>

In the end, the “moderates” led by Yugoslavia succeeded in steering the conference proceedings, with even the final document resembling ideas and concepts of the previous summit in Belgrade, making only minor

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77 Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVPRF), f. 144, op. 25, p. 58, d. 7, l. 114-120, Talk between the Soviet ambassador Puzanov and the Cuban ambassador Hernandez, September 22 1964.

78 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1964-66, box 1829, POL 8, Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia, September 21 1964.

79 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 115-128.

80 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/5, Tito’s and Sukarno’s speeches.

81 AJ, 507, CC LCY, III/104, Tito’s report on the Cairo Conference, October 28 1964.



adjustments along the way to reconcile some of the previously irreconcilable positions. This was quite evident by creating a constructive linkage among the issues like non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and economic development, on the one hand, and anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle, on the other, with each side grudgingly admitting that neither of these concepts alone represented a remedy for shaping extensive unity of all non-bloc factors, but only a potent combination of all of them could have produced a desired effect.<sup>82</sup> However, while this tentative compromise was being reached, the opportunity to set up a more permanent organization of non-aligned countries was missed again, with even Yugoslavia clearly avoiding to raise this issue as being another controversial one.<sup>83</sup>

However, in spite of Yugoslavia's efforts to galvanize the non-aligned group after the Cairo Conference by launching different diplomatic initiatives pertaining to the peace mediation in the Vietnam War in 1965<sup>84</sup>, it seemed to everyone that this struggle between the two groupings and conference models largely drained out the vitality of many member nations, as well as the group's vibrancy as a whole, thus pushing many of them down the ally of passiveness and impotence that had not been customary for these countries in the previous years. It would take much more strength and a proactive posture, particularly on Yugoslavia's behalf, to transform this loose group into a more permanent and better organized factor of world affairs. This was especially evident in the following years when a number of key non-aligned leaders (Nehru, Sukarno, Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, Nasser) were swept away from the historical scene, leaving in place their younger and less charismatic heirs, thus endowing Tito, as the only remaining senior statesman, with an even greater responsibility for the future of global non-alignment.

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As we could see in this subchapter, in a matter of 15 years Yugoslavia went through a radical transformation from a bloc-affiliated coun-

82 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1964-66, box 1829, POL 8, Assessment of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, October 23 1964; DAMSPS, PA, 1964, f-176, 442723, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, October 30 1964.

83 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1964-66, box 1829, POL 8, State Department's circular telegram, November 7 1964.

84 DAMSPS, top secret, 1965, f-1, 52, Latest developments concerning Vietnam, March 1965; CFMA, 109-02949-01, Yugoslavia's conspiracy concerning the 17 nations appeal, March 1965.

try, firmly grounded in European politics, to one of the pillars of global non-alignment, thus slowly transforming not only the essence of its own policies but also the very character of this emerging global alternative to the dominant bloc politics of the Cold War. The origins of such policies may be found in 1) the general character of Serbian/Yugoslav policies of the past that often boasted a strong independent streak, 2) the authentic revolutionary experience of the Second World War where the Yugoslav communists had sharpened their skills for negotiations with the great powers, 3) negative experiences with the policies of both blocs, as well as in 4) an inherent desire, sometimes almost a missionary one, to project one's own specific ideas beyond the constraints imposed by the great powers. As a consequence, this shift in foreign policy that clearly made non-alignment a hallmark of country's Cold War entanglements would soon propel Belgrade right onto the center stage of world politics, projecting Yugoslavia as the only European country that stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the post-colonial nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, thus receiving in return strong backing from their rising numbers. Yugoslavia would gradually become an outright engine of a dynamic political struggle for reshaping the basic features of the world order that would mark the next stage in the evolution of its role in the NAM.

### **Steering Global Non-Alignment: Yugoslavia's Concrete Contribution to the Shaping of a Global Non-Bloc Response to Superpower Policies**

Within a decade after the 1964 Cairo Conference, the global non-alignment underwent sweeping changes that transformed the loose non-aligned group of states dispersed over four different continents into the NAM, a fully-fledged international organization, one encompassing the majority of states in the UN. This was a proper international movement with all corresponding attributes of permanent presence on the world stage in the form of a clear institutional set-up and continuity of official gatherings, while also including a set of well-defined guiding principles and a rationale for protracted existence, as well as a clear program for a collective and organized future action. After the previous two ad hoc summits, both without a planned follow-up, where any permanent institutional framework was not seriously envisioned, the global non-alignment entered into a profound crisis stage, one marked by an evident lack of any

similar gatherings taking place, while the level of mutual cooperation remained at its lowest ebb ever since the early 1950s.

During these crisis years and later on, it was Yugoslavia that often held high the banner of non-alignment, even when other nations were somewhat losing their interest. Belgrade was continuously searching for a way to overcome earlier deficiencies and reinvent and redefine the essence and role of non-aligned countries in a way that would eventually escape the preferred scenario of the great powers – one of non-alignment's growing irrelevance and soon to be oblivion from world politics.<sup>85</sup> This kind of dedication was primarily directed at setting up more permanent mechanisms of cooperation among all relevant non-bloc actors as an essential tool for engaging in a constructive dialogue with the world powers over some of the fundamental features of the international order. In fact, the security agenda of the 1950s and early 1960s, dominating the proceedings of the first two non-aligned conferences, was now actively supplanted by the NAM's socio-economic, developmental and modernization agenda of the 1970s, one primarily expressed in the comprehensive struggle for the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Soon enough, the NAM headed by Yugoslavia and other nations became the spokesperson for the entire developing world, the central protagonist of the growing North-South conflict, one of dominant international factors evidently standing for the just demands of liberation, equality and prosperity.

### **Yugoslavia and the crisis of global non-alignment**

As we have seen, the fierce competition between the non-aligned and Afro-Asian conferences left the majority of the Third World in disarray, without sufficient energy to stage similar collective actions that would directly cope with the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These somber developments would introduce sudden changes into the functioning of the non-aligned world, particularly at the time when many prominent leaders left the historical scene in a matter of few years due to coups and armed conflicts, with a new radicalization drive still being present in some countries.<sup>86</sup> This neg-

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85 Jovan Čavoški, "U potrazi za novim smislom: Jugoslavija i kriza globalne nesvrstanosti 1965-1970", *Istorija 20. veka 2* (2021), 353-371.

86 Michael E. Latham, "The Cold War in the Third World" in Odd Arne Westad, Melvyn Leffler (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 260-275.

ative tendency also went hand-in-hand with the new spirit of accommodation between the two blocs where the intention to clearly chart out respective spheres of influence, without ever taking into consideration the views and interests of small nations, stood in stark contrast to what the non-aligned were aspiring to achieve in their direct dealings with the superpowers, both inside and outside the UN.<sup>87</sup>

Under such dire circumstances, Yugoslavia was facing a tremendous challenge of non-alignment losing much of its earlier strength and appeal, with both superpowers observing its prospects as rather untenable, while also harboring unhidden intentions to assist the rapid dismantling of the fledgling global alternative. Nevertheless, all this would not diminish Yugoslavia's resolve to continue with its efforts to set up an organized response to foreign meddling by putting right at the center of the non-aligned discourse two dominant issues – outright opposition to bloc interventionism, as well as insistence on a more dynamic collective economic development.<sup>88</sup> In this endeavor, Belgrade enjoyed Cairo's strong backing, since Nasser, similarly to Tito, understood well the graveness of the moment when it seemed that the only tangible argument the non-aligned countries had vis-à-vis the blocs, the overall impact of their rising numbers, was now being directly threatened by foreign interference. Therefore, both countries aspired to convene a new non-aligned summit in the near future.<sup>89</sup>

Similar as before, Yugoslavia was seeking a solution inside the tripartite format, as if a strong push from a number of countries might serve as a suitable remedy for overcoming this diplomatic paralysis. Before long, both Tito and Nasser agreed to meet the new Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi in late October 1966, thus reaffirming the role and influence of the “big three” of non-alignment in world affairs.<sup>90</sup> In fact, this initiative was Tito's specific way of forestalling the almost imminent disappearance of the non-aligned group by initially reinvigorating its active core and then proving to other partners and the superpowers that non-alignment was still “vital, effective and of value”.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, as

87 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 300-302, 348-351.

88 DAMSPS, PA, 1966, f-158, 445763, Policy of non-alignment, September 12 1966.

89 NARA, RG 59, CFPE, 1964-1966, box 1825, POL 8, Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR, March 12 1966.

90 DAMSPS, PA, 1966, f-158, 441369, Note on the tripartite meeting of leading non-aligned countries, May 11 1966.

91 NARA, RG 59, CFPE, 1964-1966, box 1825, POL 8, Yugoslav attitude toward little summit of Gandhi, Nasser and Tito, August 26 1966.

seen by the Yugoslav officials, the most serious problem at the time was an accelerated diversification of non-aligned ranks, one causing countries either to become even more radicalized, seeking a fight with one bloc, or to adopt a more malleable stance of pursuing gradual rapprochement with either superpower. However, in each case, this had a disastrous effect on the non-bloc character and independent streak of non-alignment.<sup>92</sup>

Even though the tripartite meeting in New Delhi did not trigger any significant breakthroughs in its aftermath, while a new summit was nowhere on the horizon, nonetheless, these three influential leaders did succeed in exchanging their views on pressing world issues, seeking common ground in that respect, while also identifying the links that bound together crisis situations simultaneously developing in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. In addition, they also soundly concluded that internal contradictions among the non-aligned countries had become the biggest obstacle, causing both chaotic changes in these societies, as well as transforming them into an easy prey for the superpowers. Therefore, Tito, Nasser and Gandhi concluded firmly that any future joint initiatives had to be guided by a clear affirmation of the original principles of non-alignment, thus securing an active core that would not compromise its interests, while more vibrant economic and technical cooperation between these nations was a must.<sup>93</sup> This meeting, although without producing a more prolonged effect, nonetheless, signaled the resurgence of more practical and realistic goals of non-alignment, thus announcing the future winds that would mark its agenda in the forthcoming period.<sup>94</sup>

Since the rapidly changing world situation demanded an adequate response for the benefit of the non-aligned, especially after Nasser's disastrous defeat by Israel in June 1967, one which shook the very foundations of global non-alignment<sup>95</sup>, already in early 1968, Tito decided to use his forthcoming visit to a number of Asian and African countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and the UAR) as a strong impetus to get many of these leaders on board and subsequently initiate preparations for a new summit or at least a ministerial meeting. Furthermore,

92 DAMSPS, PA, 1966, f-158, 441369, Telegram from the UN mission, November 21 1966.

93 AJ, 837, I-4-a/6, Three sessions of tripartite talks, October 21-23 1966.

94 DAMSPS, PA, 1966, f-158, 436774, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, October 31 1966.

95 Dragan Bogetić, Aleksandar Životić, *Jugoslavija i arapsko-izraelski rat 1967* (Beograd: ISI, 2010), 131-209; NMML, Apa B. Pant Collection, SF 16, Part 1, Letter from the Embassy in the UAR, September 21 1967.

his ideas also included a radical line of thinking, one that encompassed a proposal for approaching some formally bloc countries, as well as neutral ones, since, according to him, they all sought emancipation from the superpowers and they were sincerely dedicated to the cause of peace and development. In Tito's views, the world situation had become so complex that it required a much wider response than just a few non-aligned countries; however, non-bloc nations should always spearhead similar actions.<sup>96</sup>

This entire initiative, formally proclaimed after Tito's return home in March 1968, was primarily motivated by Yugoslavia's desire to reduce harmful bloc influences on the non-aligned world, widen fresh cracks in the bloc ranks, exercise more influence on the events in the crisis hot-spots, such as the Middle East or Vietnam, as well as position Yugoslavia firmly outside the Soviet sphere of influence after Nasser's forced rapprochement with Moscow.<sup>97</sup> In order to achieve that aim, in Tito's mind, the future non-aligned gathering should be exclusively dedicated to major international issues such as peace, security, independence, development, non-interference, equality, liquidation of colonialism etc., since these general matters could garner the worldwide mobilization of all peace-loving forces, while any bilateral contentious issues would be left to be discussed at other events.<sup>98</sup> Soon enough, Yugoslav special envoys were visiting countries in Africa and Asia so as to feel the pulse regarding this entire idea, with the non-aligned concept now winning back some of its previous vibrancy, stirring again serious debate within its own ranks.<sup>99</sup>

However, armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, an event that shattered Tito's illusions about the changed nature of Soviet policies, triggered a harsh response from Belgrade. Since Yugoslavia observed such an event as a blatant breach of the very principles of independence, sovereignty and noninterference it advocated, Tito sought to use this precedent to mobilize the non-aligned world behind the agenda of decisive opposition to any foreign aggression or great power bullying. Nevertheless, he would soon find out that the priority of

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96 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/37, Tito's talks with Asian and African leaders, January-February 1968.

97 NARA, RG 59, CFPE, 1967-1969, box 2869, POL 8, Telegram from the NATO mission, April 3 1968.

98 DAMSPS, PA, 1968, f-144, 48943, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, March 15 1968.

99 The National Archives (TNA), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 41/27, President Tito's diplomatic initiatives, March 22 1968; DAMSPS, PA, 1968, f-144, 410038, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, April 10 1968.

individual interests of non-aligned countries often outweighed the necessity of defending the general cause.<sup>100</sup> It was only a few African and Asian nations, including Ethiopia, Zambia, Tunisia, Indonesia and Ceylon, that rallied around Yugoslavia in their joint condemnation of Soviet policies, while most other non-aligned nations, including UAR, India and Algeria, avoided any open or protracted criticism of Moscow.<sup>101</sup>

These adverse developments signaled to Tito that he had to somewhat lower his expectations, making some painful compromises along the way, but still without abandoning his initial ideas. Therefore, it was decided to argue for a preparatory or even a consultative meeting, not a new summit, while leaving the timing for that major gathering for some other time. In fact, as understood in Belgrade, a hasty organization of the summit could have only produced an adverse effect on the future of the non-aligned cause.<sup>102</sup> However, what was truly out of the question was another postponement of this entire undertaking, since, in Tito's mind, non-alignment in general could not have survived another procrastination. Therefore, it was an imperative to convene such a gathering sometime during 1969. The overarching goal of the Yugoslav diplomatic offensive was to finally establish some of the more permanent bodies of the non-aligned group, as well as providing a more regular character to all future gatherings. Furthermore, a consultative meeting was quite necessary for summoning a preparatory meeting afterwards and then finally organizing a new summit, since without such a specific sequence of events everything would have become quite pointless.<sup>103</sup> Eventually, through intensive Yugoslav, Indian and Ethiopian exchanges, a joint decision was adopted to hold the consultative meeting in Belgrade in July 1969, while its agenda would be primarily dedicated to the following issues: the role of non-alignment in a changing world and building up concrete mechanisms for intensifying mutual consultations.<sup>104</sup>

Convening the Belgrade Consultative Meeting on July 8-12 1969, with 44 non-aligned delegations and 7 observers attending it, was indeed a huge diplomatic success for Yugoslavia, especially if one takes into con-

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100 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 346-362.

101 AJ, 507, CC LCY, III/136, Materials for the CC LCY Presidium session, October 31 1968.

102 DAMSPS, PA, 1969, f-145, 4985, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, January 16 1969.

103 DAMSPS, PA, 1969, f-145, 46348, Summary of non-aligned activities, February 24 1969; NARA, RG 59, CFPE, 1967-1969, box 2869, POL 8, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, April 2 1969.

104 TNA, FCO 28/868, Summit meeting of non-aligned states, July 7 1969.



sideration that there had been no similar gatherings for almost five years. Yugoslavia was again exercising the role of the center stage of the non-aligned group, a linchpin among so many diverse aspirations and interests, with the majority of participants finding common language with respect to major issues such as the international role of non-alignment, inducing new dynamism into the group, opposition to foreign interference, more balanced and democratic character of the world order, expansion of mutual cooperation, emphasizing the importance of the UN for small countries etc.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, a fierce debate started with respect to the issue of organizing a new summit in the near future. Yugoslavia, backed by countries like India, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Tanzania and others, considered that the time was ripe enough for such a move and it was also necessary to set up permanent forms of interaction. On the other hand, countries like Algeria, Guinea, Kuwait, Burma, Senegal and others held ground that conditions were still not favorable enough, while non-alignment had lost much of its revolutionary fervor, thus any new summit would only bring to the surface fresh divisions. Through Yugoslav good offices a compromise was eventually found that a new summit should be held soon but only after completing serious preparations first.<sup>106</sup>

Even though Yugoslavia's proposal for expanded composition of the future summit did not pass, Tito was still quite satisfied that global non-alignment had rediscovered its true identity, injecting new vitality into its inner workings, since after a long intermission, achieving these goals, without triggering a wider conflict, was a significant feat indeed. A new summit was already on the horizon, largely thanks to the Yugoslav strenuous efforts.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, already during the forthcoming 24<sup>th</sup> UNGA session, the Yugoslav side decided to build upon the positive effect produced by the consultative meeting by organizing a gathering of 59 non-aligned foreign ministers in New York in order to openly promote continuity of action, stimulate mutual interactions, as well as set down the date for the preparatory meeting that would be organized in Dar-Es-Salaam in April 1970.<sup>108</sup> In this way, a firm path was paved for the next summit to be convened by the end of that same year. In fact, Yugoslavia succeeded

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105 *Consultative Meeting of Special Government Representatives of Non-Aligned Countries: Belgrade, July 8-12, 1969* (Beograd: Medjunarodna politika, 1970), 29-168.

106 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/7, Consultative meeting bulletin, July 9-11 1969.

107 NARA, RG 59, CFPPF, 1967-1969, box 2869, POL 8, Belgrade: a qualified success, July 15 1969.

108 DAMSPS, PA, 1969, f-151, 434957, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, October 2 1969.

in keeping alive the flame of non-alignment through a very difficult crisis period, one that could have ended with its total disappearance from the historical stage.

### **Yugoslavia, NAM's institutionalization and its new global agenda**

With the onset of the 1970s, the entire world was undergoing seminal changes that were reshaping not only the relationship between the two sides of the Cold War, as well as their relationship with the world at large, but also between non-bloc countries themselves, since these nations were gradually becoming a better organized and more potent collective factor in international politics. The world of the superpower détente, one creating a more stratified international order in both political and economic senses, was becoming more a world of cooperation than conflict, an interconnected and interdependent world where all relevant factors, irrespective of their size and strength, could project their interests without immediately facing sanctions for such acts.<sup>109</sup> These were also years when during two subsequent summits in Lusaka in 1970 and Algiers in 1973 the NAM was finally established as a fully-fledged international organization, with non-alignment also becoming a clearly defined political doctrine, thus directly influencing movement's readjustment of its core agenda, one going beyond just the security and anti-colonial narratives of the past.<sup>110</sup>

Profound internal and external shifts taking place both inside the blocs and in the world created a predominant atmosphere in which lessening of international tensions and a corresponding discoveries of new modes of cooperation became the hallmark of the 1970s, thus enabling all sides in the Cold War to try to mitigate some of the contradictions plaguing their societies and poisoning their mutual relations. Both superpowers had become painfully aware that a certain degree of intra-bloc autonomy had to be tolerated, thus reducing the rising potential of internal conflicts, while also sacrificing some of their previous dominance as undisputed bloc leaders. One of the main tools for achieving such an outcome was an active promotion of a more constructive and mutually beneficial

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109 DAMSPS, PA, 1970, f-237, 417883, Consultations for the new non-aligned conference, March 16 1970.

110 Jovan Čavoški, "The Evolution of the NAM's Role in World Affairs during the Cold War Decades", 35-39.

relationship with the ideological adversaries or in the Third World, one where mutual accommodation was actively sought, while excessive confrontation was readily avoided.<sup>111</sup>

Détente had the most positive impact on the stabilization of the situation in Europe and the strategic dealings between Washington and Moscow, as well as on the opening of the inter-bloc dialogue concerning the basic vestiges of European security in the form of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this respect, Yugoslavia also exercised an active role by bringing the non-aligned agenda right onto the discussion table where mainly bloc members were involved.<sup>112</sup> However, situation did not seem so bright for the Third World, since superpower interventionism was continuing unabatedly, with the developments in Europe having no major impact on what was going on beyond that continent, except in the sense that many non-aligned countries were becoming skeptical about the very nature of détente. These trends sometimes compelled non-aligned nations to side with one bloc or the other in a certain moment, although without fully discarding their non-bloc credentials but still introducing some minor adjustments into them.<sup>113</sup>

On the other hand, the non-aligned group and the NAM were also undergoing changes in the leadership, where some old advocates of non-alignment were becoming less active and increasingly marginalized, among them Egypt after Nasser and Indonesia after Sukarno, as well as countries of West Africa, while new centers of authority were emerging in North, East and South Africa, with Algeria, Tanzania and Zambia leading the way. Together with prominent old members, like Yugoslavia, India and Sri Lanka, all these nations exercised a significant role in the shaping of NAM's new global agenda for the 1970s. Holding next two summits in the southern and northern parts of the African continent stood as a clear

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111 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 365-393; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 27-73, 146-223, 325-403.

112 Jovan Čavoški, "On the Road to Belgrade: Yugoslavia's Contribution to the Defining of the Concept of European Security and Cooperation, 1975-1977" in Vladimir Bilandžić, Dittmar Dahlmann, Milan Kosanović (eds.), *From Helsinki to Belgrade: the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente* (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2012), 84-100.

113 DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-141, 43586, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, February 4 1972; Bojana Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi međunarodnih odnosa* (Beograd: IMPP, 1976), 211-213.

testimony to these new tendencies.<sup>114</sup> Some observers would see this leadership reshuffle as an evident signal that the era of “classical non-alignment”, one where Yugoslavia, India and Egypt had overwhelmingly dominated the scene, effectively ended.<sup>115</sup> However, as we are going to see in this subchapter, this was not the case at all, especially when it came to Yugoslavia.

As soon as it was decided to hold the preparatory meeting, Tito was well aware that Yugoslavia's role in this respect had not ended with the non-aligned meetings held during 1969. Already in early 1970, he went on another long journey to a number of countries in East and North Africa (Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, the UAR, and Libya), clearly sensing the shifting balance of power in both regional representation and leadership distribution within the non-aligned group. The main goal of this trip was to create additional guarantees for the smooth preparation of the forthcoming summit, thus avoiding falling into any of the old organizational traps. In addition, Tito also aspired to personally promote Yugoslavia's stance that this major event should be convened right on the eve of the 25<sup>th</sup> UNGA, so that it could produce a considerable effect on both blocs by fully mobilizing the world public opinion behind its new agenda. According to him, this was an auspicious moment for reflecting upon the positive results of détente in Europe, and the diminishing superpower dominance, so as to finally hold the blocs accountable for their destructive policies in the Third World.<sup>116</sup>

Yugoslavia saw the preparatory meeting as a valuable opportunity to firmly set the new global agenda of the non-aligned. As part of its diplomatic strategy, the Yugoslav representatives were seeking to extend potential participation in this event to as many countries as possible, especially “moderate” ones.<sup>117</sup> In fact, the preparatory meeting in Dar-Es-Salaam was a considerable success, since its host President Julius Nyerere, inspired by the ideas on the economic essence of non-alignment having been promoted at the previous summits by leaders like Tito,

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114 John Hatch, *Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania* (Chicago: Henry Regner Company, 1976), 179-234; Mohammed Lakhdar Ghetta, *Algeria and the Cold War: International Struggle for Autonomy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 19-90.

115 CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2, The third nonaligned summit: the swan song of Yugoslav predominance, September 4 1970.

116 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/44, Tito's talks with African leaders, February 1970.

117 RGANI, f. 5, op. 62, d. 351, l. 84-91, Yugoslavia's participation in the preparatory non-aligned meeting in Dar-Es-Salaam, April 27 1970.

Nehru and Nasser, was advocating the socio-economic development to become its primary expression within a wider security framework. The main argument presented then by Nyerere was to pursue collective economic self-reliance, thus openly implying that each non-aligned country should assume firm control over its natural resources, while in parallel forging closer and more intensive mutual economic ties, separately from the great powers, thus radically reducing bloc impact on the destiny of the developing world.<sup>118</sup> Almost a decade after the Belgrade Conference, Tito's economic agenda for non-alignment was finally vindicated by becoming the mainstream thinking.

The Lusaka Conference took place on September 8-10 1970, with 54 regular attendees and 10 observers, thus already signaling that an increasing number of countries were adhering to the non-aligned agenda, while it was the first gathering of this kind that did not put major international issues as the centerpiece of its proceedings, since issues strictly related to the non-aligned were dominating the discussion.<sup>119</sup> In fact, even European issues were not treated in detail as before, in spite of Yugoslavia's dynamic presence, which slightly frustrated Tito and his comrades but they, nonetheless, understood well that the topics related to the existence of Asian, African and Latin American developing nations had to be dealt with in more detail.<sup>120</sup> However, what particularly frustrated the Yugoslav president was Nasser's sudden change of opinion not to come to Lusaka, with some other Arab leaders following suit, thus affecting the summit outcome on which Yugoslavia had so laboriously worked on. Tito suspected that Nasser's closer ties with Moscow had a decisive impact on taking such an adverse decision. This unexpected shift only confirmed Yugoslavia's fears that the blocs still could not reconcile themselves to the fact that any successes were achieved by the non-aligned group contrary to the blocs.<sup>121</sup>

The economic dimension of non-alignment, as well as concurrent strengthening of mutual economic cooperation based on collective self-reliance clearly dominated the debate, once again confirming that the general agenda of the non-aligned underwent substantial changes as compared

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118 NAI, MEA, WII/128(1)/70, Preparatory meeting of non-aligned countries, April 21 1970.

119 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 183-197.

120 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/9, Talks with the members of the Yugoslav delegation, September 10 1970.

121 DAMSPS, PA, 1970, f-240, 432596, Telegram from the Embassy in the UAR, August 25 1970.

to the previous decade.<sup>122</sup> However, another issue also stood high in the demands of attending delegations and that was permanence and continuity of future non-aligned actions, *i.e.* setting up of permanent bodies, regularly holding summits and ministerial meetings, thus avoiding the organizational chaos previously left by the Cairo Conference. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was the first to raise the issue of establishing an “adequate machinery for the coordination of non-aligned activities”, with other participants, like Tito, Gandhi and many others, adopting the key point and providing additional clarifications that went along with the line that an organized collective response was the only thing that kept the two blocs at bay from unilaterally imposing their will on the non-aligned.<sup>123</sup>

During his talks with other leaders, Tito emphasized that permanency should become the essential feature of the non-aligned group, thus avoiding the old peril of gradually becoming irrelevant or just fading away. In his mind, this goal should be accomplished by cherishing the fundamental principles of non-alignment, having a clear vision of what future actions should entail, while these steps should be taken in a protracted manner through well-defined institutional mechanisms.<sup>124</sup> Tito wanted to see permanent technical, but not political bodies of the nascent movement, primarily endowed with practical organizational and not ideological responsibilities. This was the safest bet placed by Yugoslavia that the non-aligned would have a continuous collective presence in world affairs but one where no country or a group of countries could ever assume the leadership position inside the NAM.<sup>125</sup> In the end, it was agreed that Zambia would take over the responsibility of heading the Standing Committee, the first NAM executive body, while also organizing the planning for the next summit. This was a specific moment indeed, one when the NAM was officially established as a proper international organization and Yugoslavia was the central driving force behind this process.<sup>126</sup>

The majority of participants, including Yugoslavia, were generally satisfied with the outcome of the Lusaka Conference, especially by moving the NAM's central agenda close to centrist positions. At the same time, collective self-reliance and collective permanent action were reaf-

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122 NAI, MEA, HI/121/15/70, Declaration on non-alignment and economic progress.

123 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/9, Conference bulletin, September 8-10 1970.

124 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/9, Tito-Gandhi, Selassie and Qaddafi talks, September 7-8 1970.

125 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/9, Tito's conversation with the Yugoslav journalists, September 11 1970.

126 NAI, MEA, HI/121(1)/72, Cooperation among non-aligned countries, October 11 1971.

firmed as movement's guiding principles, but the effort put into the institutionalization process had to be doubled up in the future so as to avoid the NAM's potential marginalization.<sup>127</sup> Tito was, nevertheless, dissatisfied with one fact: continuity of action was not stressed enough and the next summit, beyond a vague promise that it would be held in the near future, still was not fixed both in timing and its agenda, while the NAM strategic direction still was not defined in detail. Nevertheless, the final results of this summit were "closer to optimal than minimal", as concluded by a Yugoslav high official.<sup>128</sup> In any case, Lusaka was indeed the turning point in the history of global non-alignment when a loose group of non-bloc countries, previously holding only ad hoc meetings, became an organized collective international political force that encompassed a growing number of members, regularly holding different meetings, while also launching *well-prepared* joint actions. However, Tito would also become the last elder of non-alignment alive, with the remaining few soon to leave the historical scene, including Nasser. Nevertheless, in spite of his advanced age, he was still setting the general pace of all future actions.

While some countries were somewhat losing their interest in holding new non-aligned gatherings, considering the results of the Lusaka summit as being definitive ones, Yugoslavia and Zambia were still trying to harness this new momentum by proposing to convene at least a consultative meeting sometime during 1971. Both countries were arguing for the continuation of the NAM's ongoing institutionalization, primarily by boosting its general responsibility to collectively cope, within a new framework, with pressing global issues that produced a diverse effect on all non-aligned countries.<sup>129</sup> At Yugoslavia's insistence, a consultative meeting was finally held during the 26<sup>th</sup> UNGA session in September 1971, tackling major international hotspots and NAM's potential contribution to resolving such contentious issues. Another goal of that gathering was also to stimulate further democratization and reform of the UN so as to give additional structural importance to all non-aligned factors.<sup>130</sup>

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127 DAMSPS, PA, 1971, f-190, 44854, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, February 12 1971.

128 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/9, Talks with members of the Yugoslav delegation, September 10 1970.

129 DAMSPS, PA, 1971, f-190, 418612, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, May 18 1971.

130 NAI, MEA, HI/121(24)/71, Non-aligned consultative meeting held in New York, October 26 1971.



The next step in NAM's international activity, as seen from Belgrade and other key non-aligned capitals, was to transform the ongoing superpower détente into a more universal phenomenon, not just limited to Europe or the two superpowers, but transcending continents, regions and nations, primarily directed at breaking up the old practices of the great powers, reducing all international tensions and gradually leveling out the differences between the developed and developing parts of the world.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, there were still forces within the NAM that gave preference to political issues over the economic ones, like Egypt, desperately trying to turn back the wheel of history by reviving the "big three" of non-alignment as its active core, but to no avail.<sup>132</sup> Many in Yugoslavia understood well that this ship had already sailed and a new constellation of forces was present inside the movement, one where Belgrade had to modify its position accordingly so as to preserve its leading position as one of the decision-makers. Therefore, in Yugoslavia's eyes, the establishment of permanent coordinating bodies of the NAM in the near future, as well as further tempering of its cooperation mechanisms, became its top priorities in the forthcoming period.<sup>133</sup>

These profound internal shifts became even more acute as the Afro-Arab and Asian wings of non-alignment suddenly started wrestling over control of the movement, particularly with Asia being increasingly sidelined by the Afro-Arab majority often imposing its own solutions through sheer numbers.<sup>134</sup> This also proved to be a tremendous challenge for Yugoslavia's diplomacy to get the majority of members to hold the middle ground in all these fervent disputes, thus avoiding any radicalization drive, while still allowing regionalist tendencies to freely bloom, without suppressing them or causing corresponding cracks in unity. That type of strategy facilitated a tighter alignment of diverse individual interests with the NAM's generally accepted goals.<sup>135</sup> Consequently, a way out of this adverse situation was found owing to Yugoslavia's proposal implying that the adoption of decisions by consensus would be further elabo-

131 DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-142, 424377, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, July 6 1972.

132 DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-141, 425578, Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt, July 10 1972.

133 DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-141, 428105, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, July 31 1972.

134 NARA, RG 59, CFPPF, 1970-1973, box 1968, POL 8, The non-aligned conference: frustration and divisiveness in the Third World, December 8 1972.

135 DAMSPS, PA, 1973, f-131, 46980, Conditions in non-aligned countries and current tendencies in the policy of non-alignment, March 7 1973.

rated by adopting new procedures dealing with the approval of comprehensive documents at the NAM gatherings, ones primarily reflecting the general agreement of all members, while certain differences would be always tolerated when adopting documents related to specific issues, depending on individual views and interests of concrete member states. In this respect, the minority should never block the majority when crucial issues were at stake, thus expressing its readiness for upholding overall unity and cooperation, while the majority should always be ready to make certain compromises in order to solicit minority's backing when undertaking such important steps.<sup>136</sup>

This new tendency in organizing the NAM affairs became even more evident at its first ministerial conference in Guyana's capital Georgetown in August 1972, a gathering resembling more a summit than just a technical meeting, one where crucial decisions pertaining to the NAM's economic agenda, international profile and its further institutionalization were all fiercely debated. Under Yugoslavia's guidance, any suspicions regarding détente were eventually shrugged off, with the majority of participants now calling for its expansion beyond Europe, while elevating the dialogue between small countries and great powers, especially inside the UN, to a totally different level by openly stressing equal opportunities for everyone. Within this comprehensive political framework, a new economic platform was also defined, one that also implied creating new leverages for enhancing mutual cooperation between the non-aligned, primarily by introducing substantial changes into every country individually and only afterwards using that as a launching pad for initiating new collective actions.<sup>137</sup>

In effect, the forthcoming Algiers summit was bound to become yet another watershed moment in the NAM's history, one where its new agenda would not only become predominant but it would also be fiercely fought for by the majority of non-bloc and developing countries reclaiming in return their political and economic independence. This diplomatic struggle also implied taking over a portion of responsibility related to addressing international developments from the grip of the superpowers by opposing their hegemonic agendas and then passing it back to key multilateral institutions. The overarching goal was securing peaceful co-

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136 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/13, Report on the Preparatory Committee meeting in Kabul, 23 May 1973.

137 DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-142, 429008, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, August 18 1972.

existence that ultimately worked for the benefit of the entire developing world, thus securing the NAM's more prosperous future, primarily by avoiding direct confrontation with the blocs.<sup>138</sup> In this spirit, Yugoslavia actively advocated setting up a proper coordinating bureau as the movement's central permanent institution so as to avoid a scenario where one of the summit hosts would feel the urge one day to use its temporary credentials to fully monopolize the NAM's responsibilities and speak on behalf of all other members. On the contrary, every member had to receive an equal share in managing the movement's everyday functioning, as well as in steering its future activities.<sup>139</sup>

The Algiers Conference was held on September 5-9 1973, with 75 full participants and dozens of observers and guests, with the majority of them coming to this event with full awareness that the activities defined at Lusaka had to be brought to a logical conclusion, thus launching again, from a position of a newly discovered strength, the dialogue with the developed world over the basic tenets of the existing economic system. In many ways, at this event the NAM finally acquired its definitive shape not only in the form of firmly wielding its overwhelming numbers in the UN, but also through overt manipulation of the direct control many of its members exercised over some of the crucial world commodities, like oil and other key raw materials. This only further boosted the political and economic activism of the movement vis-à-vis the blocs in the forthcoming period, in parallel with completing the NAM's institutionalization, as well as charting its future strategy.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore, it was the official launching of the NIEO at this event, a vociferous call for a more balanced, inclusive, and mutually beneficial world order that soon gave the movement a new rationale to use its collective economic leverages so as to eventually induce concessions by holding a constructive dialogue with the developed world.<sup>141</sup>

When tackling international situation, the majority of participants were still pessimistic in their general appraisals, particularly regarding the manner in which the great powers were still disastrously handling

138 DAMSPS, PA, 1973, f-132, 432576, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, July 31 1973.

139 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/12, Tito's speech at the session of the Yugoslav preparatory committee, April 12 1973.

140 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 243-264.

141 TNA, FCO, 93/7, The 4<sup>th</sup> NAM summit conference in Algiers, September 19 1973.

the situation in the Third World.<sup>142</sup> Even though Tito could not succeed in making peaceful co-existence the central topic of this event, he, nonetheless, succeeded in creating a direct link between the promotion of European détente and the parallel process of fostering stability in the Third World as two closely intertwined phenomena. He particularly emphasized that non-aligned countries did not “seek from anyone to recognize their right to equal participation in the resolution of world problems”, since they “fought for this right, they have it and they are firmly determined to use it”. In fact, Tito found a way out of this complex paradigm by strongly advocating that the NAM should define its policies separately from both blocs and all great powers, always keeping equidistance, while individual bloc policies should be judged only through the lens of the NAM’s specific interests and goals, and not in a way any great power would like them to think or act.<sup>143</sup>

On the other hand, Tito’s participation was also closely related to the issue of future leadership of the movement where some members, like Algeria, Cuba, Libya and others, were actively seeking to marginalize the old guard by advocating tighter institutionalization in the form of establishing a permanent secretariat that would run NAM on a daily basis as an executive body, without any involvement from other members.<sup>144</sup> However, Tito admonished other attendees that endorsing such a formula would trigger a harsh response from some influential members, primarily Yugoslavia. Instead, he proposed setting up more representative bodies that would deal, in a loose manner but more effectively, with the NAM’s continuity and daily affairs, while concurrently reducing the role and influence of the summit host. Eventually, based on the Yugoslav idea, the Coordinating Bureau (CB), a collective body which ran preparations for the next summit, as well as for any other NAM gatherings, while continuously running the movement’s daily affairs from the UN, was finally founded.<sup>145</sup>

The Algiers summit, where Yugoslavia’s performance was somewhat eclipsed by the hosts, largely succeeded in substantially transforming the non-aligned agenda in a way that all outstanding world issues were dealt with in a detailed and evenhanded manner, with the Third World

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142 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15, Conference bulletin, no. 5, no. 6, and no. 7, September 5-7 1973.

143 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15, Tito’s speech, September 7 1973.

144 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, Electronic Telegrams (ET), 1973STATE180471, State Department’s circular telegram, September 11 1973.

145 DAMSPS, PA, 1973, f-135, 438085, Foreign Secretariat’s circular telegram, September 10 1973.

becoming an organized collective actor finally taking command of its own destiny and presenting its demands to the developed world in unison.<sup>146</sup> Besides, after this conference, the NAM became a disciplined voting bloc in the UN, one that, owing to its great numbers and “sensing the power it could wield”, succeeded in taking control of the UNGA, much to the chagrin of the great powers, especially the US which felt it was being increasingly isolated in the international organization. Yugoslavia was often spearheading such activities together with Algeria and other influential members, sometimes even voting together with more “radical” members of the movement.<sup>147</sup> It was a historical moment when the NAM finally reached the apex of its international involvement and its decisions started to produce serious impact on the policies of great powers.

### **Yugoslavia and the struggle for the NIEO**

The NIEO, the greatest structural challenge to the Western economic and financial hegemony in decades, was a call for fully integrating political and economic aspects of international security by putting the developmental problems of non-aligned nations to the forefront of a wider struggle to fundamentally restructure world's economic system and its central institutions based on the needs and interests of its most deprived members. This goal, as its advocates saw it, would be reached by introducing new trade practices, exercising nationalization of strategic raw materials, boosting South-South trade, enhancing protectionism, as well as setting up alternative financial mechanisms to the existing ones, similarly to Tito's idea of establishing a non-aligned bank or a solidarity fund that would finance strategic developmental projects in the Third World through the NAM's direct investments.<sup>148</sup> The NIEO was a cry for an evolutionary, not revolutionary change of the world order in a more just and egalitarian way, but one that would eventually recognize sovereign rights of each nation, shift the balance through the promotion of interdependence, along the way also erasing many of the existing deficiencies, while

146 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15, Report on the results of the 4<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, September 12 1973.

147 NARA, RG 59, CFPP, 1973-1979, ET, 1973STATE238777, State Department's circular telegram, December 6 1973.

148 Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 67-70; Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 202-204; AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15, Tito-Boumediene talks, September 2 1973

providing equal opportunities for everyone, without tolerating excessive foreign economic interference as before.<sup>149</sup>

Under the conditions of a declining détente, when events around the Third World were starting to escalate once again, it was the oil embargo introduced largely by Arab members of the OPEC during another Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 that ultimately served as an impetus for formally launching the NIEO on a global scale. These restrictions on selling oil to Western consumers and the corresponding meteoric rise in its prices soon triggered a worldwide economic and financial crisis and recession. This proved to be the moment when developing countries started inflicting serious pain on their more developed counterparts, thus opening new possibilities for non-aligned countries to establish their own collective mechanisms of action aimed at protecting their basic interests, as well as inducing serious changes into the world system by receiving a larger share in the management of that same system.<sup>150</sup>

On the other hand, poor non-aligned countries that did not possess oil or similar valuable resources were hit even harder by this hike in energy prices, thus causing a serious rift within the NAM between the oil-producing and oil-consuming members. Even though Tito firmly stood by the Arabs in this war, he warned them that any excessive wielding of the oil weapon for a longer period of time could only trigger serious retaliation from the West, eventually producing an undesirable effect. In his mind, oil should be used prudently to inflict right amount of damage, but not to cause retribution on behalf of the Western powers, thus opening enough space for initiating a new round of the North-South dialogue.<sup>151</sup> Tito was especially concerned how this new global economic crisis had affected his Asian allies who were going through a period of financial instability, so already in early 1974 he went on a tour of South Asia in order

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149 Jeffrey A. Hart, *The New International Economic Order: Conflict and Cooperation in North-South Economic Relations, 1974-77* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983), 30-61; Victor McFarland, "The New International Economic Order, Interdependence, and Globalization", *Humanity* 6.1 (2015), 219-222.

150 Christopher R.W. Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 263-301; Dinesh Singh, "Non-Alignment and New International Economic Order" in Bojana Tadić, Ranko Petković (eds.), *Non-Alignment in the Eighties: International Round Table, Petrovaradin, Yugoslavia, 28-31 August 1981* (Beograd: IMPP, 1982), 161.

151 DAMSPS, PA, 1973, f-136, 453148, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, December 14 1973; *Југословенско-алжирски односи 1956-1979* (Београд: Архив Југославије, 2014), 252-254, 257-258.

to devise a joint response to these new developments. Yugoslavia, India and Sri Lanka were quite dissatisfied with the Algerian responses as the movement's chair and with the way it was handling this crisis.<sup>152</sup>

As they saw it in Belgrade, collective action in the UN became even more pressing since the West was trying to play up existing divisions between non-aligned countries. Therefore, promotion of economic solidarity between the oil-producing and oil-consuming members became a major goal for Yugoslavia, a means to fend off foreign attempts to create new splits or deepen the existing ones, primarily by diverting some of the rising oil revenues to poor non-aligned countries suffering from an economic downturn but still without undermining the overall interests of producers.<sup>153</sup> The general idea was to have the Third World finance its own needs through mutual assistance and tentative redistribution of wealth, thus diverting some of its investments away from the developed countries and correspondingly boosting South-South economic integration.<sup>154</sup> Ever since the last summit, Yugoslavia was incessantly advocating the swift establishment of the NAM Solidarity Fund that would assist economic and political emancipation of many developing countries, thus strengthening the NAM's unity accordingly, as well as its future bargaining position.<sup>155</sup>

The first place to test all these ideas was during the 6<sup>th</sup> UNGA Special Session in April-May 1974, an extraordinary gathering convened on the initiative of the Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. This time, the NAM was seeking evolutionary changes through negotiations with the Western powers, but, nonetheless, this could not suppress their fears that the new voting bloc capacity of the movement would be used to forcefully push through the entire NIEO agenda. The US and its allies were ready to demonstrate a certain amount of flexibility and accept some proposals but not the entire package.<sup>156</sup> Therefore, the Yugoslavs were actively arguing that securing any compromises should be closely wedded to any avoidance of waging a Cold War of another type, one between the rich and poor parts of the world, thus demonstrating both flexibility and tact when

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152 AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/56, Report on Tito's visit to India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Syria", February 12 1974.

153 DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-198, 48898, Telegram from the UN mission, February 25 1974; f-173, 412867, Telegram from the Embassy in Algeria, March 19 1974.

154 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/16, CB meeting and the UNGA special session, February 22 1974.

155 DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-173, 49979, Telegram from the Embassy in Peru, March 2 1974.

156 TNA, FCO 59/1231, Reflections on the UNGA Sixth Special Session, June 12 1974; NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1974STATE048341, State Department's circular telegram, March 11 1974.



conducting such negotiations.<sup>157</sup> In the end, by adopting two crucial resolutions, NAM succeeded in extracting some concessions from the West, officially launching the NIEO through the UN bodies, thus speaking on behalf of the entire developing world, proclaiming the existing world economic system as one yearning for rectification, while in parallel actively promoting the Third World industrialization and its sovereign control over its natural resources.<sup>158</sup>

It seemed to everyone that the global balance of power was finally shifting in favor of smaller countries, changing the very fabric of international affairs. This triggered serious frustrations in Washington that started exploring different tactics so as to drive a wedge between the “moderate” and “radical” members of the movement, while also providing different incentives to win over some richer non-aligned countries to its side by manipulating their desire to cooperate with the West.<sup>159</sup> However, this new collective power of the NAM became quite visible when its members succeeded in pushing through some major decisions in the UNGA in autumn 1974, like the expulsion of South Africa from that body or officially proclaiming sovereign rights of developing nations to nationalize foreign assets or freely set commodity prices.<sup>160</sup> Even though Yugoslavia took active role in all these events, Tito was well aware that a frequent use of the UN tool to force certain controversial decisions upon the US could eventually trigger an unwanted reaction from the Americans that might include paying less heed to the role of the UN at a moment when the international organization became crucial for forwarding the joint cause of non-aligned countries. Therefore, as he saw it, the NAM needed the US to willingly acquiesce to all these compromises in order to secure their definitive and lasting implementation.<sup>161</sup>

Since applying continuous pressure on Western powers still did not yield any major breakthroughs, the Yugoslav officials were considering introducing certain changes into the NAM's tactics by adopting new measures to induce specific concessions that would strike a delicate bal-

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157 DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-199, 417732, Telegram from the UN mission, April 10 1974.

158 DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-198, 413683, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, April 23 1974.

159 Daniel J. Sargent, “North-South: the United States Responds to the New International Economic Order”, *Humanity* 6.1 (2015), 207-210.

160 DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-174, 461984, Telegram from the UN mission, December 22 1974.

161 DAMSPS, PA, 1975, f-123, 42477, Telegram from the Embassy in the U.S., January 16 1975.

ance between the pressing economic necessities of developing countries and established financial interests of the developed ones, thus eventually securing a desirable outcome for the future realization of the NIEO.<sup>162</sup> The Lima Ministerial Conference in late August 1975 proved to be the right place to test such ideas and find common ground on a number of critical issues, utilizing a strong momentum of the NAM's recent successful offensive in the UN, while concurrently exploring new possibilities for a more efficient coordination of activities in different crisis situations.<sup>163</sup> This was a place where the entire notion of South-South cooperation was finally given a new meaning and content, as it was expanding into many new fields of mutual economic cooperation and political coordination. The NAM's overall solidarity and unity of action were given a new boost in the Peruvian capital, while all decisions, due to Yugoslavia's, India's and Algeria's efforts, were presented in a constructive spirit, thus creating a new opening for another round of this key dialogue.<sup>164</sup>

However, the success of this gathering compelled the US to adopt a more positive and pragmatic stand, avoiding new confrontation with NAM, since that could have only further deepened disturbances in the world economy. That was the main reason why the US adopted a course of embracing some of the NAM's ideas, though still avoiding implementing major shifts.<sup>165</sup> In fact, Yugoslavia could sense that situation had already radically evolved, while the West was slowly regaining its structural unity and capacity to inflict damage, and therefore the blind insistence on radical solutions could have only backfired. In Tito's mind, the time was ripe enough to push through moderate agreements dealing with a number of pressing issues, without demanding an unconditional surrender of the other side.<sup>166</sup> Therefore, as advocated by the Yugoslavs, the spirit of mutual compromises was quite present during the 7<sup>th</sup> UNGA Special Session in September 1975, when some of the NAM's proposals, although not the major ones, were finally endorsed by the Western delegations as a sign

162 DAMSPS, PA, 1975, f-175, 432059, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, July 1 1975.

163 TNA, FCO 58/855, The 5<sup>th</sup> non-aligned conference of foreign ministers, September 8 1975.

164 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/20, Report on the Lima ministerial conference, 25-30 August 1975, September 17 1975.

165 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 31, Foreign Economic Policy 1969-76 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 1003-1015.

166 DAMSPS, PA, 1975, f-198, 432137, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, June 27 1975.

that certain improvements had to be endorsed into the existing world economic system, though still without making fundamental changes.<sup>167</sup>

Nevertheless, bloc attempts to create rifts among different NAM members were all indicating that the movement was entering into a period of crisis, even though the struggle for the NIEO was still not over.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, in order to preserve the NAM's unity, as well as to mitigate external interference, Yugoslavia started to advocate the redefinition of CB's mandate in order to reorganize its structure, expand its membership with better regional representation, rearrange its responsibilities, curb harmful influences and finally improve its crisis response mechanisms.<sup>169</sup> As seen from Belgrade, an internal overhaul of the NAM's structure and its tasks were a way to forestall any serious conflict scenarios, as well as group takeovers, especially through membership expansion. However, uncritical introduction of so many new countries into its ranks, on the other hand, could have also harmed the NAM's future unhindered functioning.<sup>170</sup> This was, indeed, a serious dilemma for Yugoslavia and many others members, choosing between losing some of its cohesion and action potential due to rapid membership expansion or keeping everything more within limits, with accepting less new members, but potentially remaining more vulnerable to superpower meddling through the "radicals" on both sides of the specter.

In this respect, the Colombo Conference, held on August 16-19 1976, with 86 full members attending it, together with many observers and guests, was for Yugoslavia a place where the NAM's old course could be reaffirmed again, without succumbing to different challenges coming from both internal and external sources. In this respect, Belgrade even extended considerable financial and technical aid to Sri Lanka so as to assure the success of the summit for Tito's general line.<sup>171</sup> This event devoted equal attention to both political and economic issues, firmly integrating these two dimensions and elucidating their mutual causality, primarily

167 DAMSPS, PA, 1975, f-198, 444420, Telegram from the UN mission, September 17 1975.

168 DAMSPS, PA, 1976, f-179, 413731, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, March 17 1976.

169 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/22, Report on the CB ministerial meeting in Algiers, 30 May-2 June 1976, June 4 1976.

170 M.S. Rajan, *Studies on Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement: Theory and Practice* (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1986), 88-92.

171 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/26, Information on Sri Lanka's preparations for the 5<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, October 6 1975.

by debating non-alignment's strategic orientation, as well as the current situation and future of the NIEO initiative. According to Yugoslavia, India and many other participants, the NAM had already become an unavoidable factor of international affairs, a clear alternative to bloc politics, a key contributor to decolonization and democratization of inter-state relations and a principled advocate of independence and equality for everyone.<sup>172</sup> As for the economic side of the debate, the struggle for the NIEO was reiterated again, while more concrete measures were adopted so as to further institutionalize cooperation in a number of fields with the aim of spurring the reform of the international trade and financial system.<sup>173</sup>

In general, in spite of some negative tendencies, this summit was still an overall success for the "moderate" line represented by Yugoslavia and its allies, without any unpleasant surprises then occurring, with these nations firmly holding their ground under any "radical" pressure, luring the majority to their side, thus clearly abandoning the desire for confrontation and concurrently seeking dialogue for economic progress with an eye on resolving fundamental problems of the developing world.<sup>174</sup> On the other hand, a contrary tendency was also emerging on the horizon, one that would seriously affect the purpose, unity and action capacity of the movement in the future, plunging it into an exhausting leadership struggle and subsequent structural crisis that would last for a decade. This struggle would also engage all of Yugoslavia's forces, influencing the very nature of Belgrade's involvement in the NAM. At the time when the struggle for the NIEO seemed to yield the first positive results, even the moderate ones, internal divisions and foreign interference were becoming an acute phenomenon. Individual needs of member states held the advantage over collectivist interests of the movement, thus becoming a harmful tendency for the future.

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Period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, in spite of the first years of crisis when the non-aligned group was still doing its soul-searching without finding a new expression, stood as a clear testimo-

172 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/26, Report on the 5<sup>th</sup> NAM conference, September 6 1976; Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 359-378.

173 TNA, FCO 58/982, The 5<sup>th</sup> non-aligned summit meeting, August 27 1976.

174 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1976BELGRA06146, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, September 17 1976.

ny that a non-great power entity, like the NAM, could be on firm ground in world politics and, through its sheer numbers and collective political and economic weight, as well as skillful manipulation of the nuances of the international system, achieve remarkable results in the matter of diversification of the power distribution inside the Cold War order. In fact, as another bloc-like actor, but one without unified leadership or internally imposed discipline, consisting solely of small nations, it achieved moderate success in launching one of the most serious structural challenges to the hegemony of great powers. However, such an actor never essentially went beyond the boundaries and norms of the established international system, even though it was seeking changes and improvements of the very foundations that same system stood on. It was this restrained approach, primarily promoted by Yugoslavia, where the NAM acted as a constructive and not a destructive factor, which reaped tangible results, even the moderate ones, in a far greater degree than any penchant for confrontation could have ever had.

Furthermore, this was a historical moment when Yugoslavia's presence inside the non-aligned group and within the subsequent movement was reaching new heights, ranging from its decisive role in extricating the group from a serious period of crisis when it was almost facing extinction to formulating, together with some other influential members (Algeria, India, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Zambia), a new global agenda for the NAM and the Third World that aimed at restructuring the entire world order based on the interests and needs of its least developed members, thus bringing new quality of balance and moderation into world affairs. In both these aspects, including some other ones too, as we have seen, Belgrade's impact on the decision-making process and the course of NAM's global activities was truly a decisive one, steering the entire organization clearly away from any intensive superpower involvement, providing it with a new rationale and purpose for action, while stressing even more vociferously the sovereign character of global non-alignment and its capacity to independently formulate ideas and responses to different world challenges.

### **The Best of All Possible Worlds?: The Overall Historical Impact and Lessons Learned from Yugoslavia's Active Participation in the NAM**

When we discuss historical lessons related to Yugoslavia's active participation in the NAM, the best framework within which one could

analyze this aspect would be when, during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the movement faced a profound period of crisis that eventually weakened its international role just when the sweeping historical changes, marked by an abrupt end of the Cold War, were coming to the surface in the world. This was the time when the movement still wielded a lot of political power, especially within the UN, but the concurrent collapse of the superpower détente, the so-called Second Cold War, opened the door to aggressive bloc interference in its internal affairs, putting the NAM again right at the center of the East-West conflict, with the North-South relationship slowly fading into the background.<sup>175</sup> This was a significant process that went hand-in-hand with the concurrent leadership struggle for the movement's future, which would then gradually evolve, on the back of many conflicts and factionalist challenges, into a full institutional paralysis typical of the 1980s.

These negative tendencies also contributed to the final failure of the NIEO initiative, since no one in the NAM believed that the West, restoring its economic standing, with the Third World sinking even deeper into a debt crisis, could ever be ready to make any substantial compromises. Some members were then seeking comfort in the great power arrangements, thus giving priority to individual interests over collective yearnings, which also hampered the movement's ability to react adequately as a global power broker. In fact, the West was pushing even harder to get its ways of socio-economic development based on free markets, private initiative, foreign direct investments, trade liberalization, tariff dismantling, etc. to become the gold standard of Third World modernization, thus increasing the already worrisome level of its dependence.<sup>176</sup> The economic dimension of non-alignment suddenly started to lose appeal under such adverse conditions. A new rationale for the existence of the movement, beyond its mere formal survival, had not been found yet. In parallel, especially after Tito's death, Yugoslavia was also experiencing serious political, social and economic downturn, one that would exert critical impact on the course and nature of its non-alignment.

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175 Mark Atwood Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment" in Robert J. McMahon (ed.), *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 152.

176 Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 229-259; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 334-338, 357-362.

## Yugoslavia and the NAM leadership struggle

With the onset of the late 1970s, the superpower détente already laid in ruins, with all bilateral dealings experiencing failures due to differing perceptions in Washington and Moscow of what mutual accommodations really implied. As a result, the Third World was becoming again a fierce battleground for the expansion of ideological, political, economic and military influences of the two blocs, opening new crisis hotspots, with a string of pro-Soviet regimes appearing in Asia, Africa and Latin America, thus stirring US attempts at disrupting Soviet expansionism.<sup>177</sup> Together with the mentioned global shifts, many of these superpower proxy conflicts became closely intertwined with the concurrent bilateral conflicts between non-aligned countries themselves, with Africa leading the way in this negative trend, thus making it for the NAM even more complicated to normally function normally outside of these widening rifts.<sup>178</sup> Many non-aligned leaders thought that the aforementioned bilateral conflicts became the greatest peril to the movement's normal functioning, gradually supplanting its purpose and damaging its unity.<sup>179</sup> This internal crisis was more than evident when in 1977, a year after the Colombo summit, only one NAM gathering was held, it was the CB meeting in New Delhi in April, which was totally uncharacteristic of the movement's dynamic life of the previous years.<sup>180</sup>

As a paradox, while the NAM was becoming institutionally more sophisticated, with its membership continuously expanding, hence witnessing the movement's growing global footprint, on the other hand, another current was also noticeable, one where, due to these emerging conflicts, the NAM was becoming less effective in its actions, inherently weak and disorganized, often losing its previous focus and vitality. Such unwanted developments also spurred factionalism inside the NAM that caused a deep split between the countries tilting towards either of the two blocs and those firmly upholding the original principles of non-bloc and inde-

177 Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 623-685, 732-824, 829-912; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 259-299; Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War*, 475-492.

178 Bojana Tadić, *Sukobi među nesvrstanim zemljama: dokumentacioni prilog* (Beograd: Međunarodna Politika, 1987), 31-50, 61-73, 136-166; Jovan Čavoški, "The Evolution of the NAM's Role in World Affairs during the Cold War Decades", 40-43.

179 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/26, Tito-Bandaranaike talks, August 20 1976.

180 DAMSPS, PA, 1977, f-172, 420553, Telegram from the Embassy in India, April 12 1977.



pendent involvement.<sup>181</sup> Since Cuba, a country very close to Moscow, would host the next non-aligned summit in 1979, this seemed an opportune moment for the leftist faction (Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Congo and others) to make its stand, forcefully advocating the NAM's "natural alliance" with the Soviet bloc and stressing its anti-imperialist essence.<sup>182</sup> Nevertheless, many in Belgrade did not think of Cuba as a mere surrogate of the USSR, on the contrary, but Havana's policies were often driven by similar ideological bias that could have only triggered NAM's conceptual breakup.<sup>183</sup>

In spite of his advanced age and illness, Tito was quite disturbed with this "radical" challenge that could have inflicted an irreparable damage to the movement's unity and integrity, thus destroying everything he had been fighting for since the 1950s. These disturbances were also creating new doubts about the NAM's character, role and goals, with some members opting for passivity, thus opening a breach for more proactive countries, backed by the blocs, to impose their views on everyone else.<sup>184</sup> The Cuban insistence on the division between "reactionary" and "progressive" forces within the NAM, a position which particularly annoyed Tito, was, in fact, an artificial split that could have otherwise led to far-reaching negative consequences. In the views of influential "moderate" leaders, Tito being one of them, the non-alignment had already evolved beyond its sole anti-imperialist character into a more comprehensive doctrine principally standing for independence, cooperation, equality, stability, emancipation, development and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.<sup>185</sup>

These negative developments were creating intense fears in Yugoslavia that such an ideologically motivated onslaught from the East could have triggered an equally adverse reaction from the pro-Western faction that could have ultimately opted for splitting the movement as to avoid the Cuban and Vietnamese takeover from ever materializing. However, such a challenge could have only made the leftist faction push even hard-

181 A.W. Singham, Shirley Hume, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 167-171; Bojana Tadić, *Osobenosti i dileme nesvrstanosti* (Beograd: Komunist, 1982), 37-43.

182 DAMSPS, PA, 1977, f-171, 411733, Telegram from the UN mission, March 2 1977.

183 NARA, RG 59, CFPE, 1973-1979, ET, 1978STATE155783, State Department's circular telegram, June 19 1978.

184 DAMSPS, PA, 1978, f-187, 427404, Conditions in NAM before the CB Havana meeting, May 9 1978.

185 DAMSPS, PA, 1976, f-175, 440978, Telegram from the Embassy in Tanzania, July 26 1976.

er to promote its own agenda and make a power grab in the near future, with the majority fearing the NAM's ensuing split and potentially accepting Havana's views as a painful but necessary compromise for preserving the movement's imperiled unity. Therefore, as seen in Belgrade, it was important not to cave in to any extremist demands, avoid any bloc interference and keep on pursuing the original course that made the NAM an independent and respectable factor it had become.<sup>186</sup> As once pointed out by Tito and his associates, while in the past the superpowers had been generally trying to ignore the NAM and not to attach greater importance to its decisions, now they were actively trying to infiltrate it and chart their spheres of influence within it, thus eventually causing its rupture.<sup>187</sup>

Since the future summit would be held in Havana, the other most important NAM gathering before that central event, the ministerial conference, was planned to be held in Belgrade in 1978. For the leftist faction, one of the immediate priorities was to either organize this conference in some other place, initially it was thought to hold it in Mozambique but that attempt failed, or eventually sabotage it from within, so that the subsequent success of the Havana summit could be entirely secured.<sup>188</sup> One of the hallmarks of this new leftist diplomatic offensive was to insist continuously on the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist character of the movement as the definitive benchmark for gradually overhauling its purpose and structure, while, based on these criteria, also vetting old and new members for their future roles, thus making the NAM an elitist revolutionary club not open to everyone. This was totally opposite to Yugoslavia's concept of open membership embedded in strong non-bloc credentials.<sup>189</sup>

Therefore, Yugoslavia, India, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia and some other countries, argued for the open attendance at the CB meetings, including its members, non-members and guests, thus finding security in big numbers that would give them opportunity to prevail in any debate, while, on the other hand, Cuba and its allies argued for only CB members' participation, securing their advantage naturally within a more limited format. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was insisting on the preser-

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186 DAMSPS, PA, 1978, f-188, 435315, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, June 20 1978.

187 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Tito-Rahman talks, September 5 1979.

188 DAMSPS, PA, 1977, f-171, 412563, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, March 9 1977.

189 DAMSPS, PA, 1977, f-172, 417727, Information on consultations with Cuba in Belgrade, March 9 1977.

vation of all previous decision-making procedures in order to use them as the final obstacle to the realization of any hostile intent.<sup>190</sup> Strength of the “moderate” faction, headed by Yugoslavia, was still considerable but uncertain due to the volatile situation in the world. Nevertheless, its presence was the only guarantee that the leftist and rightist factions would be eventually compelled to behave in a constructive and responsible manner.<sup>191</sup>

In fact, the NAM ministerial conference in Belgrade in July 1978 became, in Tito’s words, a crucial stop on the road to Havana that upheld the fact that no sudden turns in the movement’s general orientation would occur any time soon, while a comprehensive platform would be drafted for the next summit, thus preventing any country from unilaterally changing it in advance.<sup>192</sup> In order to secure such an outcome, Yugoslavia initiated an intensive dialogue with a number of member states, dispatching its envoys, thus trying to put together a wider coalition that would look eye-to-eye on the issues related to the founding principles and the current situation in the movement and the world.<sup>193</sup> On the other hand, Cuban delegations, also crisscrossing the Third World, were primarily interested in adding the boost to their struggle to redefine NAM’s orientation along the anti-imperialist lines, portraying the rise of the “progressive” faction as a consequence of active Western meddling into the movement’s internal affairs.<sup>194</sup>

It was on the eve of the ministerial conference that the Cubans decided to carry out a fierce propaganda attack against the Yugoslav position, blatantly accusing the hosts of working hand-in-hand with the US, undermining true non-alignment and fomenting a conflict with the USSR. This quickly led to exchanges of accusations between the visiting Cuban delegation and the Yugoslav leadership. Eventually, a compromise solution was soon found that the guests would submit more moderate proposals so as to secure the success of the forthcoming event, while the hosts would be open to any constructive suggestions and they would never

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190 DAMSPS, PA, 1978, f-192, 421059, Foreign Secretariat’s circular telegram, April 12 1978.

191 NARA, RG 59, CFPPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1978USUNN01237, Telegram from the UN mission, April 5 1978.

192 *Југославија-САД: сусрети и разговори највиших званичника 1955-1980* (Београд: Архив Југославије, 2017), 407-409.

193 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/30, Information on the current issues related to the NAM ministerial conference in Belgrade, July 18 1978.

194 TNA, FCO 58/1310, Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba, September 4 1978.

question Cuba's role as the future summit host.<sup>195</sup> With such a forced-out arrangement, the Yugoslav-Cuban showdown in Belgrade was postponed for some other occasion, with both sides comprehending that much more was at stake than just their individual grievances. Furthermore, Tito considered the Cuban challenge to be somewhat manageable, despite occasional surprises, but he was quite ready for another trial of strength with Fidel Castro in the future.<sup>196</sup>

The importance of this ministerial conference was very close to that of a summit, acting as a testing ground, especially since this gathering tackled all the fundamental issues pertaining to the NAM's identity and its role in the world. In his speech, Tito strongly reaffirmed the movement's non-bloc and independent identity as its core principle, one that, as he stressed, had nothing to do with the current disturbances in the global balance of power. He was also quite critical of any pro-bloc leanings among its members, particularly related to bilateral conflicts, as well as of any attempts to foment discord based on ideology, religion or any other reasons. However, as a sign of reconciliation, in the end he provided his strong backing to Havana as the summit venue.<sup>197</sup> Soon enough, the majority of other participants were reiterating Tito's points, while the Cubans and their allies were often taking a back seat in this debate, with only occasionally raising some of the issues close to their heart but still not insisting on them. The same went for Western-leaning members whose attempts to stir discussion on the summit venue were effectively curbed by the Yugoslavs.<sup>198</sup> With respect to all fundamental issues, the Yugoslav position overwhelmingly prevailed in all final documents, even in the mitigated formulations of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial character of non-alignment, which was a small concession to the leftist faction.<sup>199</sup>

Nevertheless, this gathering, although it turned out to be a significant success for the Yugoslav diplomacy, could not fully eliminate ideological polarization from its ranks, with many conflicting issues still left

195 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/30, Talks between the Cuban delegation and the Vice-President Fadilj Hodža and Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec in Belgrade, July 24 1978.

196 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1978BELGRA05561, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, July 30 1978.

197 Josip Broz Tito, *Nesvrstanost i savremeni svijet*, Vol. 2 (Beograd: Komunist, 1982), 648-653.

198 TNA, FCO 58/1310, Non-aligned conference: general debate and work of the plenary, August 4 1978.

199 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/30, Report on the NAM ministerial conference in Belgrade, August 24 1978

unresolved, thus casting a long shadow on the events leading up to the next summit. Differences between the most proactive members were still so great that all this seemed to be only a tactical adjustment for the next round of struggle for leadership, negatively affecting the movement's ability to stage effective actions in the meantime.<sup>200</sup> However, what largely worked against the Cubans in Belgrade, as seen by the Yugoslav officials, was their unhidden desire to push through their entire agenda there and then, also wrapping up some of their tangible achievements into distinctive ideological flavor, without waiting for the future summit to end and only afterwards see what cards they had been dealt for the future.<sup>201</sup> On the other hand, Yugoslavia was particularly disturbed with a worrisome trend that many "moderates" could eventually decide not to travel to Havana, thus leaving a part of the movement in Cuban hands, or that the majority of attendees may even try to expel Cuba from their ranks, hence also endangering the NAM's integrity and unity. These were both the worst case scenarios that Yugoslavia wanted to avoid at any cost.<sup>202</sup>

Since the overall pessimism could not be expelled from the heads of non-aligned leaders, Yugoslavia speeded up its work on the summit platform, stressing all important points that basically went contrary to the leftist stand so as to garner the widest possible support from other members in its struggle to keep the movement intact in both its principles and orientation. Even Tito was sometimes thinking whether to travel to Havana but he understood well that without his towering presence a desirable outcome could not be achieved. There were no other leaders of his stature to do this job, with Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike being recently voted out of office, and Boumedienne was dead.<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, Yugoslavia adopted a new diplomatic tactics to either isolate Cuba and its allies inside the NAM or force them to stand down, and this tactics revolved around the reinterpretation of the bilateral Yugoslav-Cuban dispute as a much wider dispute between Havana and the majority of other members over the movement's fundamental principles.<sup>204</sup>

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200 TNA, FCO 58/1310, The Belgrade conference of NAM foreign ministers, August 2 1978.

201 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1978BELGRA05718, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, August 4 1978.

202 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1978BELGRA05793, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, August 8 1978.

203 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/31, Tito's speech at the CC LCY Presidium session in Herceg-Novi, March 22 1979.

204 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-184, 47123, Telegram from the UN mission, February 10 1979.

On the other hand, the Cuban side directed its efforts at reorganizing the CB in such a way that the NAM chairman, the future summit host, would get far greater executive powers, while the role of other members and regular CB meetings would be respectively diminished, contrary to what Belgrade was pursuing with respect to the CB and its greater openness and democratization.<sup>205</sup> Havana was particularly trying to mobilize African and Arab nations to its cause, using its massive military presence in the south of the continent or its harsh criticism of Israel, portraying itself as a dedicated anti-colonial fighter. In this respect, the Cubans invested additional efforts to expand their platform for the future summit so as to find as many common points with the African and Arab nations as possible, thus securing a wider consensus through which it could also promote some of its original points that could have otherwise caused resentment among these same participants.<sup>206</sup>

The CB meeting in Colombo in June 1979 somewhat served as a dress rehearsal for the Havana summit. Yugoslavia, India and the hosts seriously prepared themselves for any surprises Cuba, Vietnam and their allies could stage. In spite of certain fears, the general debate, although fierce, as well as the contents of the final documents, were all finally embedded in the agenda and argumentation of the “moderates”, thus keeping the movement harmonized with its previous course.<sup>207</sup> Yugoslavia was then strongly arguing for a significant membership expansion so as to acquire new allies that would back its performance, but this idea raised doubts among some others, like India, as to whether such a move would eventually only diminish the NAM’s capacity to formulate a coherent response.<sup>208</sup> These were all substantial issues that could produce a negative effect on the NAM in the long run, however, the leadership challenge was an immediate problem for Belgrade and it had to be dealt with promptly. Therefore, when the Cubans submitted their draft of the summit’s final documents, all couched in anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet terms, Yugoslavia and its allies decided to work out a tenable compromise solution where any controversial formulations would be eventually omitted from all these documents.<sup>209</sup>

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205 DAMSPS, PA, 1978, f-197, 467900, Telegram from the UN mission, December 15 1978.

206 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-186, 418063, Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba, April 2 1979.

207 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/33, Report on the CB ministerial meeting in Colombo, 4-9 June 1979, June 19 1979.

208 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-184, 435828, Telegram from the UN mission, June 27 1979.

209 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-187, 439907, Telegram from the UN mission, July 23 1979.

When Tito arrived with a large delegation in Havana at the end of August, he was well aware that the burden of responsibility he had to carry was even greater than before. The future of the NAM would be decided in one way or the other based on his performance, therefore, he had to demonstrate his full leadership capacity, as well as his statesmanlike authority and astuteness.<sup>210</sup> As soon as Tito arrived, many leaders of the “moderates” rallied around him, seeking his advice, exchanging views, eventually hammering out a joint strategy against any surprises the hosts and their allies could prepare, one that would preserve the movement’s unity without eventually fracturing it.<sup>211</sup> On the other hand, through some intelligence sources, the Yugoslavs were also informed beforehand that Castro was ready to reach a compromise with Tito over some contentious issues so as to guarantee the summit’s final success.<sup>212</sup>

While the ministerial conference was held on the eve of the summit, with the Yugoslav and Cuban delegations often at their throats over the issue of Kampuchean representation or potential Egyptian suspension<sup>213</sup>, Tito and Castro concurrently met during two private meetings where they openly discussed all unresolved issues and controversies. Tito stressed that, in spite of individual differences, both countries should work together to preserve the NAM’s original character and overcome its deficiencies, with Castro also agreeing with these points. The Cuban leader denied the accusations that he was subordinating the movement to Soviet policies, and he offered to find common ground jointly in the interest of the majority of members. In the end, the two leaders reached a conclusion that they should resolutely oppose any outside interference directed against the NAM’s unity. In addition, Castro also gave personal assurances that there would be no unpleasant surprises at the summit, which left a soothing impression on the Yugoslav president.<sup>214</sup>

The Havana Conference was held on September 3-9 1979, becoming the largest non-aligned gathering thus far, with 92 full members, 20 observers and 18 guests taking part in its proceedings. Since the old divisions could not fade away so quickly, Castro’s and Tito’s speeches became a rallying cry for both “radicals” and “moderates”, largely embodying

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210 Vladimir Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija: studije i dokumentarni prilozi* (Beograd: ISI, 2010), 263-269.

211 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-189, 445437, Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba, August 27 1979.

212 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, SID information, August 31 1979.

213 NAI, MEA, HI/162/11/79, The 6<sup>th</sup> NAM summit in Havana, September 26 1979.

214 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Note of Tito-Castro talks, August 31 1979.



their basic ideas and key arguments.<sup>215</sup> Contrary to what he had promised to Tito, Castro's opening speech was dedicated to the future tasks; it abounded with anti-imperialist and anti-colonial rhetoric about the NAM's essence, thus portraying Cuba as a dedicated fighter for the revolutionary cause. Bloc confrontation and Western hegemony, in his eyes, were named as the true foes of the NAM, while the USSR was portrayed as someone who extended a helping hand in this just struggle. Some of his carefully chosen words were an implicit criticism of Yugoslavia and its "opportunism", a thing that could not go unnoticed by Tito, thus causing his unhidden discontent.<sup>216</sup> When on the second day Tito was bound to speak, as a seasoned statesman, he decided to do it in a conciliatory manner, as opposed to Castro's earlier flamboyant performance, basing his speech upon the NAM's glorious past, always stressing continuity in the preservation of its original principles, especially in the context of cementing the movement's non-bloc and independent character. Tito also claimed that the unity should be based on the sincere respect of diverse views and interests held by so many members, thus avoiding any attempts at imposing one's own will on everyone else. This was an overt criticism of Castro's ideas. Unity in diversity and opposition to all foreign meddling, as emphasized by the Yugoslav leader, were perceived as a priority.<sup>217</sup>

Soon enough, these speeches served as an inspiration for the two opposing groups, stirring heated exchanges during the general debate, as well as in the specialized committees, with the hosts attempting to give procedural preferences to their allies (around 20 delegations), which caused a lot of consternation among the Yugoslav and some 50 other delegations. Some influential leaders, like Nyerere and Kaunda, were further developing Tito's points by insisting that the NAM was not a bloc and it was and would always be directed against any bloc policies.<sup>218</sup> Furthermore, the Yugoslav president was conscious enough that any divisive issues, like the Kampuchean representation or Egypt's potential suspension due its peace treaty with Israel, if given time to evolve, could stir up even more trouble in the future, so postponing them indefinitely would be even better than putting them on the agenda and watching another trouble brew

215 Dragan Bogetić, *Nesvrstanost kroz istoriju*, 499-526.

216 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Castro's speech, September 3 1979; Živojin Jazić, *Moj pogled na diplomatiju (1957-2005)* (Beograd: Čigoja, 2010), 151.

217 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Tito's speech, September 4 1979.

218 AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Conference bulletins no. 7-11, September 5-8 1979.

into a new open rift.<sup>219</sup> In the end, through joint efforts of the Yugoslav, Indian and Algerian delegations, with the Cubans also demonstrating their willingness to compromise, all summit documents were put together in a more moderate spirit, while the CB membership was expanded and its structure reorganized in accordance with the Yugoslav proposals.<sup>220</sup>

In this struggle for the NAM leadership, Tito succeeded in outmaneuvering his adversaries, forestalling a “radical” onslaught, bringing victory to the “moderate” group and preparing the NAM for the next historical phase, one that would already be without him. Nevertheless, an independent and non-bloc essence of non-alignment, promoted so strongly by Yugoslavia since the 1950s, came through again as an obvious winner, leaving any ideas about alignment with the interests of either bloc right on the movement’s margins where they belonged.<sup>221</sup> This setback also forced Castro’s hand not to overplay it again in the future, while the Yugoslavs considered that the time for a revolutionary agenda was already running out, and pressing socio-economic troubles of the Third World would again top the non-aligned agenda in one way or the other.<sup>222</sup> When Tito passed away in May 1980, many feared a new leadership takeover from Havana, Hanoi and others. It was, nonetheless, the Cuban approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that did more to harm Castro’s potential bid than any absence of Tito’s towering presence. Nevertheless, this Yugoslav-Cuban leadership struggle left the NAM drained out of vitality and without a precision compass to weather the mounting challenges of the 1980s.

### **Yugoslavia and the NAM crisis of the 1980s**

In the aftermath of the Havana summit, dramatic divisions lingering from that event lasted well into the 1980s, triggering a tide of profound disenchantment and utter helplessness experienced by many of the NAM’s members. It seemed as if the movement would formally survive, thanks to Tito’s last stand, but some others also started to wonder

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219 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1979HAVANA08252, Telegram from the interest section in Cuba, September 8 1979; AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/35, Conference bulletins no. 8-9, September 6-7 1979.

220 TNA, FCO 58/1584, The 6<sup>th</sup> non-aligned summit meeting, September 20 1979.

221 DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-189, 449429, Foreign Secretariat’s circular telegram, September 27 1979

222 NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1979BELGRA07098, Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia, September 21 1979.

whether its soul had been ripped out as a result of these unceasing internal tensions.<sup>223</sup> Increasingly aggressive superpower involvement in the Third World, especially in Afghanistan and Central America, and the escalating Cold War in general<sup>224</sup>, stood as a clear testament that external meddling and readiness of some non-aligned nations to find individual solutions with either of the two blocs, irrespective of the interests of their immediate partners, remained the greatest obstacle in narrowing down the gap created by many disputes. Radicalization drive coming from both right and left was further affecting the NAM's functionality, credibility and readiness to act in a more balanced way, thus paralyzing its ability to mount a coherent and effective response.<sup>225</sup>

Many leading non-aligned countries, like Algeria, Sri Lanka and Zambia, were openly discussing the movement's fragmentation and regression as its "new normal", one that had plunged the NAM into further disarray, the most serious one in the previous 20 years.<sup>226</sup> On the other hand, Cuba was rapidly losing its credibility as the current NAM chairman, with the considerable majority of members harshly condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Only a handful of nations stood by Cuba's pro-Soviet stand. Nevertheless, none of the major actors in the NAM could have openly stood by the Soviet side in justifying its aggression against a fellow non-aligned country.<sup>227</sup> These events only added to the NAM's ongoing paralysis of leadership, exacerbating ideological polarization, since no one really trusted Cuba's ability to present necessary confidence-building measures, let alone to promote the movement's reform in a meaningful way. Nevertheless, no one was ready to openly challenge Havana's credentials due to the danger of finally breaking up barely preserved unity. In the meantime, many NAM members came to a grim conclusion that great power interventionism had become the greatest per-

223 Jovan Čavoški, "The Evolution of the NAM's Role in World Affairs during the Cold War Decades", 44-46.

224 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 299-326, 339-357; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 977-1121; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 502-518, 535-561, 576-577.

225 Hanspeter Neuhold, "Non-Alignment in 1985: Problems and Prospects" in *The Policy and Movement of Non-Alignment - New Tendencies and Options: International Round Table, Petrovaradin, Yugoslavia, 1-3 November 1985* (Belgrade: IIPE, 1986), 52-54.

226 DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-162, 4385, Telegram from the Embassy in Algeria, January 3 1982.

227 Michelle Getchell, "Cuba, the USSR, and the Non-Aligned Movement" in Thomas C. Field Jr., Stella Krepp, Vanni Pettina (eds.), *Latin America and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 165-166.

il on the road to reasserting the movement's global role, thus evidently shattering its basic principles.<sup>228</sup>

Yugoslavia was clearly disturbed by all these troubles. Nevertheless, officials in Belgrade were also adopting a more innovative approach to this grim situation. For them, saving NAM's future was an evident political priority, since that was still a well-tested and the most secure form through which Yugoslavia expressed its individual aspirations, but they also started making distinction between the movement itself and the general foreign policy of non-alignment, considering that the doctrine had existed even before the movement was founded and that it would continue to exist in individual countries even if the movement suddenly ceased to exist. This seemed a contingency policy of keeping Yugoslavia steady on a non-aligned course in European and world affairs even if its current form of global involvement suddenly underwent radical changes.<sup>229</sup> In fact, the Yugoslav officials understood well that a compromise had to be found by refocusing NAM's efforts to deal with the major international issues, those posing pertinent threat to world peace, while avoiding any local or regional controversies that could have triggered a new round of disagreements. In this way, long-term interests of the movement and a balanced approach to the general interests of all members served as a rallying point for the revitalization of the NAM's presence, while, according to the Yugoslavs, this would also be the easiest way for shutting down any overt bloc interference into its affairs.<sup>230</sup>

In parallel to Yugoslavia's efforts to find a diplomatic solution for the Afghan crisis<sup>231</sup>, Belgrade also launched a diplomatic offensive to organize an extraordinary NAM ministerial conference by the end of 1980 so as to finally devote necessary attention to the pressing issue of foreign interventionism, with the conflict in Central Asia looming large in the background. The general idea was to have this conference somewhere in Asia or parts of Africa where the leftist faction could not exercise any immediate control. The majority of members stood behind this proposal but no one from those two continents had the stomach for standing up to the Cubans, so Yugoslavia was compelled to put additional pressure on India to speed up its preparations for the regular NAM ministerial conference already scheduled for 1981. Comprehension in Belgrade was to hold

228 TNA, FCO 973/81, Prospects for the NAM, February 1980.

229 DAMSPS, PA, 1980, f-178, 49458, Telegram from the UN mission, February 13 1980.

230 DAMSPS, PA, 1980, f-218, 454707, Telegram from the UN mission, October 8 1980.

231 Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011), 319-367.

this gathering in New Delhi in early February, thus thwarting any potential competing proposals from ever being tabled, as well as enhancing the prestige of Indira Gandhi who had recently been voted back to office as Tito's obvious substitute in handling some of the NAM's central affairs.<sup>232</sup>

This conference was the first major NAM gathering since the Havana summit, since no other meetings had been organized in the meantime. In this respect, it was India's priority to keep the movement together at any cost, even at the expense of correctly handling or even resolving some contentious issues, a tactics which was not favored by Yugoslavia, but it was understood. New Delhi's idea of steering NAM's affairs by only a few nations, like India, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Cuba, also went against Belgrade's earlier plans of having a much wider leadership format, since for the Yugoslav officials any closed circles were indicating that there were hidden attempts to hijack the movement in the interest of just a handful of countries.<sup>233</sup> Since the Indian approach of reaching tentative compromises during the NAM ministerial conference (February 9-13 1981) did not always work as desired, it was through the joint efforts of India, Yugoslavia and Algeria that a workable solution was found for a number of pressing issues, thus mitigating the immediate effect of an ongoing organizational paralysis, while also minimizing the damage from the recent factional struggles.<sup>234</sup>

It seemed to some that after this gathering the NAM managed to reassert its global role as an independent political and moral factor, with the two superpowers now paying more heed to what it was doing. It was the escalating bloc conflict that had forced the hand of the superpowers to readdress the delicate balance of power where many of the non-aligned nations could have tipped the scales in an undesirable way.<sup>235</sup> However, as seen in Yugoslavia, this was a double-edged sword, since that could have also implied more outside interference with the NAM's affairs in order to prop up strength of one faction against the other, thus transforming the superpower conflict into a long-term internal problem for the movement, one subverting its essence and hindering its capacity to react. Essentially, the NAM was then compelled to launch the process of redefining its ap-

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232 DAMSPS, PA, 1980, f-217, 434361, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, June 20 1980.

233 DAMSPS, PA, 1981, f-202, 42293, Telegram from the UN mission, January 16 1981.

234 DAMSPS, PA, 1981, f-203, 412673, Report on the NAM ministerial conference in New Delhi, March 11 1981.

235 Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 220-221.

proach to key issues of security, cooperation and development, along the way also overcoming many of its internal deficiencies. Yugoslavia and India were clearly leading the way in this respect.<sup>236</sup>

This was also the time when the Iran-Iraq War, the biggest and bloodiest conflict between two non-aligned nations, was still raging on without an end in sight. Since the next summit was planned to be held in Baghdad in 1982, for Yugoslavia and other members it was evident that the prospects for that event were rather bleak. However, Iraq was insisting that it could still organize it, while Iran refused to attend it and threatened with war escalation.<sup>237</sup> The NAM was trying to mediate this conflict for a while, with Yugoslavia poised at spearheading these efforts, even though Cuba had recently succeeded in sidelining Belgrade from the movement's good offices committee in charge of these efforts.<sup>238</sup> Since the Yugoslavs were well aware that a Baghdad summit proved to be an illusion, they started working industriously on getting India to become the new host but without alienating the Iraqis, since that could have become fatal for the NAM unity. Therefore, this transition had to be done prudently so as to allow Iraq to save face and India to assume its role without any controversies. This was a hard diplomatic battle to be fought, with Cuba increasingly opting for extending its chairmanship for a while longer or hinting at organizing an extraordinary ministerial conference in Havana as a substitute.<sup>239</sup> Eventually, through Yugoslavia's strenuous efforts that included both dispatching members of its leadership to Baghdad to gain Iraqi acceptance, as well as overturning Cuba's activities in the UN, it was finally decided to organize the summit in New Delhi in March 1983.<sup>240</sup> Even though Tito had been gone for two years, Yugoslavia, despite its internal troubles, still wielded more than enough diplomatic influence to push through such a major decision for the entire NAM.

Soon enough, contrary to the escalating situation in the world, everyone hoped that India would bring more balance and moderation into the NAM's functioning, similar to the past summits. Yugoslavia was

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236 DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-159, 421223, Foreign Secretariat's circular telegram, May 7 1982.

237 Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata*, 418-461; DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-159, 433291, The Iran-Iraq war and dilemmas about holding the 7<sup>th</sup> summit, July 12 1982.

238 DAMSPS, PA, 1981, f-201, 442094, Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba, August 20 1981.

239 DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-160, 438744, Telegram from the UN mission, August 9 1982.

240 DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-160, 439929, Information on the efforts to move the 7<sup>th</sup> NAM summit to New Delhi, August 24 1982.



continuously shadowing New Delhi in all its activities, except some, like the CB reform where Belgrade opted for an open and democratic body, while India advocated a more restricted and exclusive one. Nevertheless, these were not major differences, since both nations understood well that only through their joint efforts the “moderate” line would prevail again, the NAM would regain some of its international prestige, so both nations dispatched delegations to different countries so as to forge wider unity and gain necessary leverage to guarantee the desirable outcome of the forthcoming summit.<sup>241</sup>

The New Delhi Conference was held on March 7-12 1983, with 99 full members attending it, together with dozens of observers and guests, and, as reflected through Indira Gandhi’s opening speech, a balanced and constructive approach was assumed by the hosts so as to discover as many points of agreement as possible among so many diverse members, bonding closely together collective and individual interests of the majority of them. The old issues of security, peace, independence, development, etc. topped again the non-aligned agenda, together with its firm non-bloc and equidistant character, like it had been the case when Tito was the dominant force behind the NAM. Soothing atmosphere was permeating the entire gathering, except when the superpower policies were openly criticized. On the other hand, radicals on both sides of the aisle were effectively marginalized, thus bringing back fond memories of an all-encompassing solidarity and cooperation characteristic for the groundbreaking summits from Lusaka to Colombo.<sup>242</sup> The final documents, initially prepared by India and Yugoslavia, were emphasizing again the unacceptability of superpower domination and economic inequality as the two main perils to the stability and prosperity of the non-aligned world. The relevance of the NAM’s fundamental principles was restored again at this summit, thus providing the movement, at a critical moment, with a leeway to chart its protracted existence in a more pragmatic manner.<sup>243</sup> This was the first summit without Tito, but his spirit was quite present

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241 DAMSPS, PA, 1983, f-128, 43, Reminder on the situation in NAM and preparations for the 7<sup>th</sup> summit, December 30 1982; CREST, CIA-RDP85T00287R000700650001-5, The NAM: India’s chairmanship and relations with the superpowers, March 1 1983.

242 DAMSPS, PA, 1983, f-153, 411263, Report on the proceedings and results of the 7<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, March 14 1983.

243 A.W. Singham, Shirley Hune, *Non-Alignment in the Age of Alignments*, 330-335; Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 235-237.



in everything the hosts did, sometimes even more than in the activities of the Yugoslav delegation.<sup>244</sup>

In spite of the immediate success of the New Delhi summit, nonetheless, the NAM's overall situation had not changed much, with the aggressive bloc behavior, especially the Western one, still being present, slowly opening doors to a period of stagnation. The NAM was starting to lag behind world developments, without an ability to provide an adequate response, even though Indira Gandhi, all things considered, did her best to keep the entire construction moving forward, even at a reduced pace.<sup>245</sup> Her untimely death in late 1984 deprived the NAM of potentially the last major political figure after Tito that could have had the ability and authority to successfully hold everything together. Castro was still there but he was already compromised by his pro-Soviet stance, with the two extreme factions locked in a stalemate, while the "moderates" were becoming less and less inspired to act. Besides, no one in Yugoslavia's leadership had the capacity or charisma to personally fill in that major void but the country's diplomatic service was still among the best ones and it remained Belgrade's strongest card to play in the future.<sup>246</sup>

Since the NAM's overall capability was significantly reduced, it found the easiest way out of this quagmire by rallying back most of its members behind issues that all of them considered unquestionable: decolonization of Namibia and ending apartheid in South Africa, with Palestine also often being present as a joint cause. Nevertheless, this also implied that the movement, as a globally conceived entity, was undergoing regionalization, with the African affairs now dominating its general agenda.<sup>247</sup> Since it was still impossible to hold the 8<sup>th</sup> summit in Baghdad, some influential members raised the issue of Belgrade as the next venue, expressing hopes that the original pillar of non-alignment was still up to the task of mobilizing the entire NAM again. However, the leftist faction wanted to use its strong presence in Africa in order to organize the summit there and outmaneuver the "moderates". As a consequence, Yu-

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244 DAMSPS, PA, 1983, f-153, 411723, Telegram from the embassy in Egypt, March 15 1983.

245 DAMSPS, PA, 1984, f-156, 431444, NAM after the 7<sup>th</sup> summit, June 20 1984; S.B. Jain, *India's Foreign Policy and Non-Alignment* (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000), 262-268.

246 DAMSPS, PA, 1985, f-131, 415057, Situation in NAM on the eve of the extraordinary CB meeting in New Delhi, March 26 1985.

247 Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata*, 478-566; DAMSPS, PA, 1985, f-152, 424275, The issue of hosting the 8<sup>th</sup> summit, May 14 1985.

goslavia, with the aim of getting ahead of any unpleasant surprises, immediately accepted the recently liberated Zimbabwe to host the summit in 1986.<sup>248</sup> This practical move also raised Yugoslavia's prestige as one of Harare's and Africa's closest allies in the NAM and on the world stage.

With the inter-bloc tensions gradually diminishing after 1985, as well as the superpower dialogue only starting, the NAM was still mired in its passivity, lack of enthusiasm, serious economic troubles and it was largely disoriented with respect to recent developments, increasingly leaving to the superpowers to shape their destiny. It was still only Yugoslavia and India that demonstrated heightened readiness and ability to fight for the NAM's future.<sup>249</sup> These trends were even more evident during the Harare Conference (September 1-7 1986), an event with the least numerous attendance of the heads of state or government yet, during which no new NAM members were admitted, no new ideas were floated, superpowers were not much interested in its proceeding, while the final documents became the most extensive ones but without making any new points. It seemed that everyone came to the summit because it was a decent thing to do. Yet, numerous members were already seeking protection for their individual interests in other quarters of world politics. In the end, as a real precedent, for the first time the host of the next summit was not named, which was a serious breach of the movement's procedures, thus having serious impact on its future, now making it an even more uncertain one.<sup>250</sup>

Since the Cold War in Europe and the Third World was being gradually wrapped up by the superpowers in the late 1980s, with an entire global epoch soon seeing its conclusion<sup>251</sup>, the NAM was still clinging on to that passing era, missing a valuable opportunity to formulate a new response for the future that would require an altered set of principles, institutions and mechanisms for enhancing cooperation among the developing nations.<sup>252</sup> Yugoslavia was especially aware that any deals between

248 DAMSPS, PA, 1985, f-154, 448840, Situation in NAM and Yugoslavia's international position, October 31 1985

249 DAMSPS, PA, 1986, f-152, 430464, Platform for the activity of the Yugoslav delegation at the 8<sup>th</sup> summit, July 8 1986.

250 DAMSPS, PA, 1986, f-155, 440034, Report on the 8<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, September 22 1986; M.S. Rajan, *The Future of Non-Alignment and the Non-Aligned Movement: Some Reflective Essays* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1990), 85-104.

251 Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991* (London: Macmillan, 2015), 119-426; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 365-450; Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 565-591; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 365-395.

252 TNA, FCO 973/562, NAM – search for more effective role, October 1988

the superpowers could be eventually made at the expense of the NAM, therefore the movement had to prepare itself for the unexpected changes in order for this global dialogue to become truly multilateral, encompassing all global actors, as well as moving beyond just the issues relevant for the two blocs. In response, the NAM was also obliged to define new ways of sustaining its international presence, restructure its decision-making procedures, and expand cooperation with different actors, also encouraging constructive regionalist initiatives in the interests of its global goals, thus overcoming all previous constraints of dealing with problems in an ineffective way.<sup>253</sup>

In spite of its many problems and escalating ethnic tensions, nonetheless, Yugoslavia made the modernization of the movement for a new era its immediate priority, thus overcoming many of its internal obstacles to a more active involvement in the NAM. This was also an opportunity, in a time of crisis, to keep the beleaguered country together by giving it a more prominent international role.<sup>254</sup> During the ministerial conference in the Cyprus capital Nicosia in September 1988, through its diplomatic astuteness, Yugoslavia threw its entire diplomatic weight into the arena so as to become the host of the next summit in 1989, with Nicaragua and Indonesia eventually withdrawing their candidacies, thus bringing the entire NAM back to its point of origin. Then a new body was established, the Ministerial Committee for the Improvement of NAM Activities, one that would seek appropriate solutions for adopting new and more efficient modes of action, also putting again socio-economic issues, now under new political, economic, financial and technological conditions, different from the NIEO demands, right at the center of future non-aligned activities.<sup>255</sup>

As envisaged by Yugoslavia, the Belgrade Conference held in September 1989 was supposed to serve as a moment of truth for the convergence of interests among so many NAM members under the evolving global settings. It was to be a place where the spirit of reconciliation, not confrontation with the great powers would be present, together with the movement's increasingly constructive integration into the dawning post-Cold War world order that could yield certain benefits, especially in the economic and technological spheres, thus adapting the NAM and each mem-

253 DAMSPS, PA, 1988, f-109, 422806, Current issues and activities of NAM, May 19 1988.

254 Tvrtko Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar – od Preka do vrha svijeta* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2020), 437-447.

255 DAMSPS, PA, 1988, f-110, 437288, Report on the NAM ministerial conference in Nicosia, September 16 1988.

ber state to the new realities that would have an even more profound impact on them in the years to come. Contrary to the previous experiences, Yugoslavia was preparing to submit very short and concrete final documents, so as to make it precise and clear what the summit's decisions for the future were and how they would be effectively implemented.<sup>256</sup>

In fact, the security and socio-economic dimension of the past, as advocated by the Yugoslavs during this summit, would be also rearranged to meet the demands of the post-Cold War period, adding new revolutionary topics such as ecological preservation, humanitarian protection and sustainable development to the list of priorities that would have major impact on the destiny of the developing world up to now. This would become a new NAM paradigm through which a new North-South dialogue would be sought in the future, one where joint challenges would be tackled, not solely the ones plaguing the Third World. In addition, Yugoslavia would also effectively remove any ideological polarization from the table, marginalizing all bloc acolytes, thus bringing back the spirit of restraint and moderation into the mainstream, while all major political or economic issues would be framed in a new way, separately from the previous Cold War experiences, thus clearly identifying wider repercussions for the world at large and its overall stability in the coming decades.<sup>257</sup>

Even though Yugoslavia disappeared from the historical scene only two years later in a bloody civil war, with the NAM being unable to protect one of its leading members from both internal separatism and foreign interference, thus indicating clear limits to its power and influence, nevertheless, the 1989 Belgrade summit, with its far-sighted and pragmatic guidelines, secured the movement's protracted existence to this day, even in a diminished capacity, with some forms of non-alignment still being present in the individual foreign policies of many developing nations.<sup>258</sup> In fact, a streak of neutrality, even only a military one for now, and a strong desire to discover its own way on the international stage, still persist in Serbia's engagement with the world, thus demonstrating that experiences of the previous decades, and interactions with the nations beyond Europe and the great powers, have all left a lasting

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256 DAMSPS, PA, 1989, f-101, 427170, Platform for the 9<sup>th</sup> NAM summit, July 5 1989; Sally Morphet, "Three Non-Aligned Summits: Harare 1986, Belgrade 1989 and Jakarta 1992" in David H. Dunn (ed.), *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 150-157.

257 DAMSPS, PA, 1989, f-106, 439916, Report on the 9<sup>th</sup> NAM summit in Belgrade, September 21 1989.

258 Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 259-265.

stamp on the consciousness and strivings of the wider public, as well as on the dominant political forces shaping the country's international relations. A sort of a multi-vector foreign policy, essentially an unaligned one, and a strong penchant for a more independent stand from the great powers, taken together with evident inclinations to find partners beyond the wider region where Serbia comes from, form a tangible legacy of earlier times, thus charting a dynamic underlining tendency that could not be easily waved off by anyone in Belgrade, without even a little thinking about the adverse effect that it might produce on the national unity and the general public support.

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When we, after this entire elaboration, turn to the historical lessons of Yugoslavia's involvement with the NAM, we could easily conclude that the Cold War framework, as well as Belgrade's astute handling of its intricacies in the form of adopting non-alignment, all turned the country into one of the greatest beneficiaries, both politically and economically, of that entire epoch, something that has become even more evident from a historical hindsight. That was an era when the specifics of the dominant bipolar alliance-based system provided Yugoslavia with such a significant relative weight in international affairs which, based on its real demographic, economic and military strength, it would have never possessed at any other time in history. On the other hand, it was Tito's sharpened political instincts for sensing imminent changes in the world situation, and his well-tuned skills in handling both regional and global affairs, that put this small country into the very center of international politics, thus becoming an influential power broker that could have directed a third of humanity into one corner or the other, so as to induce some global shifts, or could have kept it firmly between the blocs for gaining more leverage in pushing through an alternative global agenda.

All this was particularly true since the somewhat static form of the global balance of power, typical of the entire Cold War period, one that could not trigger any major changes for decades, eventually enabled Yugoslavia to use this imposed stability so as to opt for new foreign policy choices more easily or take advantages of any emerging cracks in the existing bloc system, thus turning non-alignment into the best policy option for a small nation seeking to elevate and redefine its position inside the existing international hierarchies. In this case, non-alignment became

the essence of Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cold War, its specific response to the dictates of European and world politics, one finding inspiration in the earlier historical experiences of embedded independent strivings, but one totally adjusted to the demands of a world that became truly globalized and where all continents, other than Europe and North America, also played an equally relevant role in international affairs for the very first time. It was non-alignment, as well as Yugoslavia's active participation in the NAM as one of its founders and leading members, that made Belgrade not only a well-respected and dynamic actor of world politics, but also an actively sought out partner for propelling comprehensive cooperation between small states on a more global scale.

Non-alignment was obviously not Yugoslavia's first choice for a foreign policy orientation, since the country experimented with bloc affiliation, both direct and indirect one, for almost a decade. It was old historical stimuli, as well as engendered uneasiness when dealing with any great power subordination, together with a strong desire not to emulate any of the dominant ideological patterns, that gradually pushed Yugoslavia down the path of an independent and non-bloc policy, firmly connecting it with similar actors concurrently emerging on other continents, thus providing the country with the additional strength in globally rising numbers. It was these specific experiences with the blocs, mostly negative ones, that clearly demonstrated to Belgrade how their internally imposed discipline directly limited justified aspirations of small countries, their desire to have their own say, making them even more subservient inside the international system than it was really necessary. Therefore, Yugoslavia's non-alignment became a strong expression of country's distinct historical character and separate identity from the rest of the European continent already mired in bloc divisions, its fresh ticket into the forward ranks of international politics under altered historical conditions.

In the Yugoslav case, non-alignment and the NAM went hand-in-hand for almost the entire period, since the movement as a permanent form of global cooperation became the main vessel that could have sent out relevant messages to the entire world or made collective pressures being felt in the great power capitals. However, even without the movement itself, Yugoslavia's choice for non-alignment, most definitely, would not have been questioned as long as the overall Cold War system stood intact, since it provided the country and Tito's leadership with enough breathing space to carefully steer its course between the East-West Scylla and Charybdis. Yugoslavia's experience with the great pow-



er détente in the 1950s and 1970s clearly demonstrated that the country could still pursue its own course in European politics, even without having the entire non-aligned group or the NAM on its side in those debates. As we could see throughout this chapter, even when there was no movement in the beginning or when it was facing crisis or decline in the end, Yugoslavia's non-alignment continued to function more-less unhindered in these adverse times, keeping the country together through active foreign policy means.

It was only when the Cold War abruptly ended, taking away all external structural preconditions that kept Yugoslavia's existence secure, as well as made its non-aligned foreign policy course viable, with internal ethnic struggles finally gaining the upper hand, such an orientation was not in a position to produce an alternative ending to an already tragic one unfolding at the time. However, it also stands true that even bloc affiliation could not have been a firm guarantee for a different historical scenario to occur either. Case studies of some bloc members, especially from the socialist camp, like the USSR or Czechoslovakia, also produce an edifying lesson in this respect, indicating that even bloc membership could not have triggered an alternative scenario to an unwanted break up. Nevertheless, the essential problem was not in Yugoslavia's non-alignment, since in many ways that kind of policy was almost a natural choice for the country based on all its previous experiences, as well as resulting out of the existing international conditions, and it did create many positive outcomes that we cherish to this day in any dealings with the increasingly relevant non-Western world. Furthermore, it is particularly due to these specific features that such an external orientation still creates a considerable impact on certain streaks of Serbia's foreign policy today, drawing inspiration for many, in spite of current inclinations towards a new form of alignment.

However, a foreign policy of any kind, a bloc or a non-bloc one, an independent or dependent one, without having strong internal systemic foundations, both political and socio-economic ones, could not ultimately function in a desirable way or produce a corresponding effect, thus eventually producing a major impact on the country's presence and sustainability in world affairs. This also proved to be the main challenge for Yugoslavia's non-alignment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Non-alignment's evident successes in many different spheres during the Cold War period could not be transformed ultimately into a protracted phenomenon of the post-Cold War era, primarily due to the loss of internal consensus that kept the entire country together, not to mention overwhelmingly



directing its foreign policy course. Therefore, any new choice of an independent and non-bloc policy in the future would require building up all systemic mechanisms from the ground up so as to create necessary levers to uphold such a complex historical choice. History is full of necessary lessons, and it is up to the people of today and the future to see how they study them, and what morals they draw from them.

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